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INTRODUCTION

The crux of corporate law lies in the agency problem between
shareholder-owners and non-owner managers. 1 Though corporate
statutes 2 and common law have historically attempted to police this
agency problem by imposing fiduciary duties on managers, 3 the
business judgment rule and exculpation clauses, 4 among other
procedural hurdles,5 all but insulate directors from accusations of
I See DANIEL

F.

SPULBER, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WITH

ENDOGENOUS ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 268-69 (2009)
(examining why agency theory assumes that the separation of ownership and control
is a problem, but "the theory of the firm views separation as a source of value"). These
two theories represent the two main camps in corporate governance scholarship: those
who treat shareholders as principals of the agent-directors and those who treat
directors as having inherent powers stemming from the creation of the corporation.
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1967); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
2 Unlike partnership statutes, corporation statutes rarely explicitly describe either
the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, or the business judgment rule, though courts
apply these concepts as a matter of course. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010)
(detailing requirements for an interested transaction to be valid); TEX. BUS. ORGS.
CODE ANN. § 21.418 (2016) (titled "Contracts or Transactions Involving Interested
Directors and Officers"); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.62 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2010)
(describing steps that a director may take before entering into an interested
transaction so that the transaction will not be voidable or actionable).
3 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982) ("The fiduciary principle is an alternative to direct
monitoring.... [a]cting as a standard-form penalty clause in every agency contract,
the elastic contours of the fiduciary principle reflect the difficulty that contracting
parties have in anticipating when and how their interests may diverge."); Larry E.
Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 76-77 (1989)
(positing that fiduciary duties arise out of the implied contract between the
shareholders and the board and that the fiduciary duties fill in the "gaps" in the
contract).
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015); see Christine Hurt, The Duty to
Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 271 (2014) (describing the practical realities of duty
of care claims against a board of directors given both the business judgment rule and
an exculpation clause).
5 For example, fiduciary duty claims against a board of directors must be brought
as a derivative suit, with demand made on the board to sue themselves unless demand
would be futile. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of
Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 382-83 (2008) ("Unlike direct shareholder suits,
derivative claims must first be filtered through the board of directors, a requirement
that theoretically eliminates the possibility of shareholders wasting the corporation's
time and resources on frivolous complaints, but that in reality eliminates most
derivative lawsuits."). But see Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom:
An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2010) (finding that more
derivative shareholder suits against Delaware corporations are filed in federal courts
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substituting their own decisions for the will of shareholders, 6
admittedly a heterogeneous group. 7 One of the few scenarios in which
Delaware courts continue to scrutinize managers' decisions is in the
context of a breach of the duty of loyalty, 8 particularly when a conflict
of interest arises between an officer or board member and the
corporation. 9 Moreover, Delaware courts purport to analyze more
intensely board decisions regarding the acquisition of the company,
arguably one of the two most important moments in the life of a
corporation. 10 For decades, courts have recognized that directors,
particularly manager-directors, may have a conflict of interest in
choosing to maintain the status quo over granting shareholders the
right to an attractive return, and so engage in additional scrutiny of
directors actions in these situations.11 This scrutiny, otherwise known
as the Unocal test after the seminal case, applies both to board
decisions to sell to one bidder over another and to decisions to reject
an unsolicited, or hostile, acquisition offer, thereby refusing a
transaction that would allow shareholders a vote to sell en masse (or
beforehand to speculators) at a premium. However strong the rhetoric

than those filed in Delaware, suggesting a belief that probabilities of success are higher
in federal court).
6 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
1 (2008) ("The purpose of corporate governance is to persuade, induce, compel, and
otherwise motivate corporate managers to keep the promises they make to
investors.").
7 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 568-71 (2003) (reconciling the theory that
shareholders are principals and have "control" over the corporation with the
explanation that shareholders delegate that control to directors, who accordingly
control the corporation).
8 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2002).
9 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) (finding that after Delaware
adopted section 102(b)(7) allowing companies to opt out of liability for the duty of
care, the bulk of derivative suits brought in Delaware were duty of loyalty claims
involving conflicted director actions).
1o See Paul L. Regan, What's Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 952-61
(2001) (describing the judicial scrutiny given to defensive tactics in the hostile
takeover era of the late 1980s).
11 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
("Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.").

20161

The Hostile Poison Pill

of scrutiny, courts, particularly Delaware state courts, 12 have not
policed these pro-status quo decisions with a vengeance; if boards can
demonstrate that their tactics - from rejection of uninvited but
friendly offers to the adoption of defensive tactics against hostile
tender offers - are reasonable and proportionate and designed to
protect (their) long-term corporate strategy, courts will not second13
guess their actions.
Many of the seminal corporate law cases from the late 1980s discuss
the validity of various forms of the popular defensive device known as
the shareholder rights plan, or poison pill, 14 a tactic boards adopted to
ward off hostile bidders. As the era of hostile takeovers ended, a legal
equilibrium settled around validating garden-variety poison pills that
were not complete practical barriers to the market for corporate
control. 15 When enacted, poison pills usually do their job: would-be
acquirers make tender offers subject to revocation of the poison pill,
the board digs in, some shareholders sell to speculators 16 as offers
increase or attract higher competing offers, 17 and the board is legally
12 See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at
*16-17 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (distilling the analysis to (1) whether the board
sufficiently investigated a threat it reasonably deemed as such and (2) the response to
the threat was not coercive).
13 See Regan, supra note 10, at 949-50 (arguing that "only half of the promise that
once was Unocal remains").
14 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995) (further
refining the Unocal intermediate test under which courts analyze the adoption of
poison pills by boards of directors); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175-76 (Del. 1986) (analyzing a poison pill and other defensive
tactics adopted by Revlon to rebuff one bidder, Pantry Pride, for its preferred bidder);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (upholding a modern
shareholder "rights plan" or poison pill); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958 (upholding a
primitive rights plan the that Unocal board adopted to thwart potential acquirer Mesa,
which would have the effect of diluting shareholder-Mesa once Mesa acquired
additional shares in its tender offer).
15 As used in this Article, a "garden-variety" poison pill is one with an ownership
trigger between 15-30% that is redeemable by any current or future board. See
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998) (holding
that a delayed redemption provision barring a newly elected board from redeeming
the rights plan for six months if the purpose is to facilitate a transaction with an
"interested person" is invalid); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (rejecting a "dead hand" rights plan).
16 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 105 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(discussing how at the time of the trial, many of the shareholders were arbitrageurs or
"arbs" with short-term interests).
17 In 2015, Jos. A. Bank lowered its 20% poison pill trigger to 10% after Men's
Wearhouse launched a hostile tender offer. See Rachel Abrams, Jos. A. Bank Amends Its
Poison Pill, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 3, 2014, 11:36 AM), http//dealbook.nytimes.
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justified in choosing the highest bidder or even none at all. 18 Scholars
disagree on whether poison pills are value-reducing to shareholders in
robbing them of higher premiums paid by either the first or
subsequent acquirers. 19 However, the Delaware20courts have held that
in most situations, poison pills are legally valid.
Against this backdrop of growing deference to boards of directors in
implementing poison pills and refusing to redeem them, a new threat
to board authority has emerged: the activist shareholder.21 These types
com/2014/01/03/jos-a-bank-amends-its-poison-pill/. Eventually, Jos. A. Bank sold to Men's
Wearhouse in a negotiated transaction for $1.8 billion, representing a 56% premium over
the market price of its shares when Men's Wearhouse first made an offer. See Maggie
McGrath, Men's Wearhouse Reaches $1.8 Billion Deal to Acquire Jos. A. Bank, FORBES
(Mar. 11, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/03/11/
Hayley
mens-wearhouse-reaches-1-8-billion-deal-to-acquire-jos-a-bank/#6dd062607b69;
Peterson, Men's Wearhouse, George Zimmer Is Waitingfor Your Call, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 11,
2015, 9:20 AM), http//www.businessinsider.com/mens-wearhouse-founder-zinmerinterview-2015-12. In 2014, pharmaceutical company Allergan used its poison pill to ward
off bidder Valeant long enough to negotiate an acquisition by Actavis. See Arash Massoudi,
Poison Pill Proves to Be a Deal-Breaker, FIN. TiES (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:07 AM), http//www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/60b2a55c-7f16-1 1e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.htnl#axzz4KRmdEmzB.
18 See In re Holly Farms Corp. S'holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342, 349 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(upholding target's preferential treatment of one bidder because the terms of that
bidder's offer were more favorable to the shareholders). Note that MCI, Inc. used a
poison pill to rebuff Qwest's higher bid for the company in favor of its preferred
bidder, Verizon, in May 2005. See Yuki Noguchi, MCI Investor Fighting Merger with
Verizon, WASH. POST (June 16, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.coniwpdyn/content/article/2005/06/15/AR2005061502254.html (describing a hedge fund
shareholder in MCI as unhappy that the MCI board accepted Verizon's $8.5 billion
offer and rejected Qwest's $9.74 billion offer); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (holding
that it was reasonable for a board of directors to find a lower bid "substantially
equivalent" to a higher bid because of nonfinancial aspects of the offer).
19 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to
Symposium Participants,55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 892-93 (2002) [hereinafter Staggered
Boards] (presenting a case study of Union Pacific's unsuccessful bid for Pennzoil at
$84 per share in cash, over a 40% premium, which failed in the face of Pennzoil
board's refusal to redeem the pill, resulting in a withdrawal of the tender offer and the
decline in share price to $35 for almost three years until the eventual sale of the
company); Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L.
381, 384-85 (2002).
20 Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *5 (Del. Ch.
June 3, 2011) ("Delaware courts have repeatedly approved of the adoption of a rights
plan."). But see eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 29-30 (Del. Ch.
2010) ("Like any strong medicine, however, a pill can be misused.").
21 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 682-83 (2010) (describing activist shareholders
as "the new blockholders" and arguing that these institutions take a page from the
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of investors, often activist hedge funds, agitate not for control of a
corporation, but instead for access to the board in order to argue for
changes in strategy. Defensive tools used against hostile bidders at first
seem inapplicable to these types of nuisances; staggered boards and
poison pills with typical 15-20% triggers seem irrelevant.22 However, a
pair of cases decided in Delaware may give managers an idea of how to
cope with these aggressive blockholders. One case, Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., allowed a company's board to keep a
poison pill in place for over a year even though the bidder did not
seem to pose much of a cognizable threat to the corporation. 23 By
itself, Airgas does not seem to give much relief to a board dealing with
a noisy 5% or 10% shareholder. However, just a year earlier, the
Delaware Supreme Court blessed a poison pill that would be triggered
if a shareholder increased its ownership to 4.99% of the corporation,
the lowest ownership threshold to be brought before the court. In
Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., the Delaware court upheld
the poison pill even though the board did not focus its argument on
the threat of a takeover. 24 In that case, a "danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness" existed because the activist shareholder's creeping
purchases would foreseeably constitute an "ownership change" under
existing federal tax law and would lead to the loss of certain tax assets,
known as net operating loss carryovers (NOLs). 25 Because the NOLs
were a very large, if unusable, asset to Selectica that would be severely
limited under section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code if the
ownership change occurred, the court held that the low-trigger rights
plan was reasonable and proportionate against a legitimate threat. 26
Together, these cases seem to suggest a new weapon to be used against
activist shareholders: a poison pill with a very low trigger. 27
Unfortunately, the Delaware courts accepted Selectica's argument
that the creeping acquisition could involuntarily cause the target
shareholder empowerment playbook to pressure boards of directors to return value to
the shareholders).
22 See Stephen Gandel, Did Bill Ackman Just Kill the Poison Pill?, FORTUNE (Nov. 6,
2014, 4:10 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/06/bill-ackman-kill-poison-pill/ ("But
even Lipton seems to think the poison pill isn't the defense it used to be, particularly
in the age of activist investors looking to overthrow boards.").
23 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55-56 (Del. Ch. 2011).
24 Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 599-600 (Del. 2010).
25 See id. at 600-01; see also I.R.C. § 382 (2012).
26 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 599-608.
27 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation,97 CORNELL
L. REv. 849, 891-92 (2012) (concluding that whether a corporation could use an NOL
poison pill against an activist hedge fund "is an open question under Delaware law").
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company to lose a large tax asset. The Unocal test is supposed to
require the board to articulate its rationale for implementing a
defensive tactic, foreclosing the opportunity for pretextual
arguments. 28 However, this analytical technique may not work in the
NOL context. Selectica's argument has two problems. First, section
382 does not work as haphazardly as the case seems to suggest;
companies do not generally involuntarily face total loss of NOLs and
have other tools at their disposal to avoid that negative outcome. 29 In
addition, the courts accepted Selectica's valuation of its NOLs, a value
which almost certainly was not realistic. 30 Finally, many corporations
that adopt an NOL poison pill will not be as sympathetic as Selectica:
most companies do not have NOLs valued at seven or eight times the
value of the company; most companies do not have a highly
concentrated public float; and most companies will not have edged
themselves as close to the section 382 ownership change line.
This Article attempts to shed some light on the operation of section
382, in order to disclose some of the faulty assumptions surrounding
the NOL poison pill. In addition, this Article uses a dataset of 155
companies that adopted NOL poison pills to examine what types of
firms are using this defensive tactic. A board might argue in good faith
(or not) that an NOL poison pill is necessary to defend itself against a
strange and diverse cast of characters: the Hostile Acquirer, the
Accidental Bungler, and the Bad Faith Saboteur. However, an NOL
poison pill necessarily has little or no deterrent effect and no physical
effect against any of these actors. In fact, the only shareholder that the
NOL poison pill effectively deters is the activist shareholder,
suggesting that the use of the poison pill in these cases may be
"hostile."
Part I of this Article gives a brief history of the shareholder rights
plan and the Unocal intermediate scrutiny that continues to be applied
to defensive tactics adopted by a board of directors. Part I also
28 Airgas, 16 A.3d at 57.
29 Section 382 results in a limitation on the post change corporation's use of NOLs
based on the company's market capitalization. See infra Part II.B.
30 At various points in the litigation, Selectica possessed over $150 million of
NOLs, which may be used against firm income. As a microcap company worth about
$22 million and with a history of little or no income, the probability that Selectica
would be able to use more of the NOLs than allowed after a section 382 ownership
change was highly unlikely. See Selectica, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jun 30,
2015) ("We have a history of losses and may incur losses in the future. We incurred
net losses of approximately $13.7 million and $8.2 million for the fiscal years ended
March 31, 2015 and 2014, respectively. We had an accumulated deficit of
approximately $288 million as of March 31, 2015.").
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analyzes the latest garden-variety poison pill case, Airgas. Part II
provides some background on net operating losses (NOLs) and the
ways in which section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code works to
limit the use of NOL carryovers following certain types of ownership
changes. Part II also introduces the NOL poison pill, or "tax benefit
preservation plan," and analyzes how the Delaware courts have treated
the NOL poison pill in the Selectica litigation. Part III discusses the
strategic uses of NOL poison pills and Part VI presents some theories
suggesting that NOL poison pills are being used for both tax
preservation purposes and to thwart activist shareholders. Part V
discusses potential amendments to section 382, and Part VI presents
some thoughts on how the Delaware courts should respond to NOL
poison pills in future shareholder suits. This Article concludes by
drawing conclusions from the data surrounding tax benefit
preservation plans and these theories.
I.

BACKGROUND - THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN
(AKA "POISON PILL")

A.

Defensive Tactics Against Hostile Takeovers

In a negotiated merger, shareholders of the target corporation are
offered a premium over the market price of their shares in return for
providing the hostile bidder with aggregate control of the company.
Directors may reject a merger offer out of concern for the terms of the
offer or out of concern that a new majority shareholder will negatively
impact the directors' own positions or those of management. 31 If
acquisition offers are rebuffed, the bidder may choose to take the
matter directly to the shareholders and make a hostile tender offer. 32
31 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)
("[D]irectors are often confronted with an "'inherent conflict of interest" during
contests for corporate control "because of the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders .... (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992))); eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Human
judgment can be clouded by subtle influences like the prestige and perquisites of
board membership, personal relationships with management, or animosity towards a
bidder.").
32 The concept of a hostile tender offer is almost always associated with publiclyheld corporations in which shares may be purchased on the open market. However, in
rare cases, a shareholder rights plan has been adopted by a closely-held corporation
for reasons other than defending against a hostile tender offer. See eBay Domestic
Holdings, 16 A.3d at 32-34 (analyzing shareholder rights plan adopted by the board of
Craigslist, Inc., all of the shares of which were held by two individuals and a
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Then, the board of the target will communicate to the shareholders its
reasons for recommending that the shareholders reject the offers. In
addition, the board may implement various defensive tactics or rely on
measures it has already adopted, such as a staggered or classified
board, a shareholder rights plan or poison pill, or other creative
contractual hurdles to a change of control. 33 A reasonable use of a
defensive tactic will encourage the original bidder to increase its
premium or invite higher bidders; 34 an unreasonable use will thwart
all bidders and entrench management. 35 Therefore, the decision to
adopt or maintain a defensive measure may be challenged under the
duty of loyalty because the directors' interests may possibly conflict
with the interest of the non-bidder shareholders. 36 Because of this
conflict of interest, shareholder rights plans are initially suspect and
do not receive the beneficial presumption of the business judgment
37
rule until the plan is given special scrutiny by the courts.
corporation, and ultimately deciding that the two shareholders (holding about 75% of
the shares) that adopted the plan did not do so "in response to a reasonably perceived
threat or for a proper corporate purpose").
33 For example, a company may have entered into certain material agreements
with a "change of control" provision, therefore lessening the value of a company
following such a change. Many times the counterparty negotiates for this provision,
but recently boards have themselves negotiated for such a provision, earning them the
name "proxy put" provisions.
34 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181
(Del. 1986) (noting that Revlon's Note Purchase Rights Plan was reasonable because
"Iflar from being a 'show-stopper,'... the measure spurred the bidding to new
heights, a proper result of its implementation"); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, 16
A.3d at 28 ("[Rlights plans (knows as 'poison pills' in takeover parlance)
fundamentally are defensive devices that, if used correctly, can enhance stockholder
value but, if used incorrectly, can entrench management and deter value-maximizing
bidders at the stockholders' expense.").
35 See Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 19, at 892-93 (suggesting that
Pennzoil's thwarting of Union Pacific's offer destroyed shareholder value for the
company).
36 Interestingly, the Unocal case was brought by the bidding shareholder, Mesa,
but the case analyzes the possible conflict between the board and the non-bidding
shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court was not concerned with the conflict
between the board and the bidding shareholder, which was being discriminated
against by being excluded from and diluted by the shareholder rights plan. See Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Story of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum: The Core of Takeover Law, in
CORPORATE LAW STORIES 227, 232 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) ("Unocal is also
important because it permitted, for the first time in Delaware law, a defensive measure
that discriminated against a particular shareholder with respect to payouts made to
other shareholders of the same class.").
37 See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEx. L. REV. 261, 261-62
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B.

ShareholderRights Plans

The defensive "poison pill," or shareholder rights plan, is a tactic of
the board of directors to fend off would-be hostile bidders that is
subject to heightened scrutiny in theory, but in practice, has become
generally accepted as within the purview of acceptable board actions. 38
These rights plans have endless variations, but typically are triggered
when a would-be acquirer increases its ownership to a substantial
threshold, such as 15-20% of the outstanding stock. 39 Upon being
triggered, the plan would confer some sort of benefit to the
shareholders other than the acquirer and would impose a
corresponding cost on the acquirer. 40 The most common type of
shareholder rights plan would trigger a right of all non-bidder
shareholders to purchase shares equal to their holdings at a deep
discount, such as 50% of the market value, thus diluting the bidder's
accumulated shares and increasing the number of shares remaining to
be purchased.41 The true value of the poison pill is in its deterrent
value. 42 The pill has neither the legal or practical force of preventing
(2001) (describing this "proactive review" by courts and finding it lacking).
38 See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 474-75
(Del. Ch. 2000) ("In itself, the Unocal test is a straightforward analysis of whether
what a board did was reasonable.").
39 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 39, 56 (2012) (noting that of the 805
publicly-held companies that had poison pills, the trigger was higher than 10% in 85%
of them and higher than 15% in 24%); Nicholas Even et al., How Low Can You Go?: An
Insiders' Perspectiveon Selectica v. Versata and NOL Poison Pills, 39 No. 2 SEC. REG. L.J.
1 (2011) (noting that a typical poison pill has a 20% or 15% trigger and that as of
March 31, 2011, approximately 785 public companies had adopted such pills).
40 For example, a rights plan might confer on non-triggering shareholders the
right to purchase more common stock at a steep discount, diluting the acquirer. Or,
the rights plan might issue non-triggering shareholders debt securities that would
have the right to be redeemed upon a change of control, increasing the purchase price
for the acquirer.
41 See Alan M. Long, Note and Comment, Locking the Boardroom Door: What Can
Georgia Courts Learn from Recent Delaware Poison Pill Decisions?, 32 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
727, 730-31 (2016) (giving an overview of variations of shareholder rights plans).
42 Many commenters point to the fact that public companies with poison pills in
place have declined substantially. See Jessica Hall, Poison Pills Drop to Lowest Level in
20 Years, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010, 4:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usdealtalk-poisonpills-idUSTRE62T5D320100330 (citing SharkRepellent as reporting
that adopted poison pills fell in public companies from over 2,000 in 2001 to about
1,000 in 2010). Of course, a company can adopt an "on-the-shelf' poison pill at any
time. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 863, 911 (2013) (positing that increasingly concentrated institutional investor
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an acquisition; instead, its economic force increases the ultimate cost
to the acquirer beyond that which a reasonable acquirer would be
willing to pay for the target. If the target miscalculates the cost of the
pill or the appetite of the bidder, then the triggering of the plan
becomes a small hurdle, not a wall. However, a board of directors
could continually "reset" a shareholder rights plan to further hinder
and ultimately stop the highly motivated bidder.
The concept of a shareholder rights plan as a defensive tactic was
first upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. ,43 then blessed more specifically by the same court
in Moran v. Household International,Inc.44 that same year. Though the
court held that the board of directors in Unocal had not breached its
fiduciary duties in adopting the shareholder rights plan to thwart
Mesa's two-tier tender offer, the Unocal case provides a two-part test
with which to analyze specific shareholder rights plans 45 and other

defensive board tactics. 46 Often described as "intermediate" scrutiny
ownership and its pressure on management has decreased the maintenance of poison
pills).
43 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See generally Andrew G.T. Moore II, The Birth of
Unocal - a Brief History, 31 DEL.J. CORP. L. 865 (2006).
4 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).

If a shareholder rights plan is part of an arsenal of tactics designed to favor one
bidder over another, then the tactics working together may be scrutinized under the
analysis provided in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). Under this analysis, a board of a company that has chosen to put the
company up for sale must satisfy its Revlon duties to procure the best available
transaction for the shareholders. See id. at 182 (stating that once "the break-up of the
company was inevitable[,]" the "duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit" and the directors moved from being
"defenders" to "auctioneers"); see also In re Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 7197VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at *5-*14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (analyzing defensive
arsenal, including a poison pill, as actions that may breach Revlon duties when the sale
of the company became inevitable); In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S'holder Litig., No.
6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *4-*8 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) (analyzing poison
pill and its carve out as part of various defensive tactics to protect merger agreement);
J. Travis Laster, Lecture, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It's True and What It
Means, 19 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 11 (2013) ("The Revlon decision really was
applying Unocal, just as the Delaware Supreme Court said.").
46 See In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2014 WL 3696655, at *7*13 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs stated a "reasonably conceivable
claim" under Unocal for challenging an Acquisition Bonus Agreement giving the CEO
a hefty payout in the event of an acquisition, which the board described as being
adopted for various reasons, including "the potential threat of the Company itself
being an acquisition target"); Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del.
45

Ch. 2013) (applying Unocal to a "proxy put" in a $4.3 billion trust indenture that
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when compared with ordinary breach of fiduciary duty analysis under
the business judgment rule, the Unocal test "smokes out self-interest
and pretext" in "situations where boards of directors make decisions
that have clear implications for their continued control." 47 The first
prong of the test is process-oriented: whether the board has
"reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed." 48 In deciding this question, a court might
analyze the steps that a board took to conclude whether a threat
existed. 49 This threat could be directly to the corporation or to the
shareholders in the form of a coercive offer (structural coercion) or
inadequate offer (substantive coercion).50 Second, the defensive action
the board takes should be "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. "51 Though the Unocal court recognized that in acting to
prevent unsolicited tender offers, directors, or the board as a whole,
may be acting in their own interest and not the interest of
shareholders, the board's adoption of its poison pill was found to have
passed the Unocal test because of the coercive nature of known
corporate raider T. Boone Pickens' two-tier bid.52
operated to trigger repayment upon a "change of control," which included a change in
the majority of the members of the board of directors unless the original board
consented); Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 107-09 (Del. Ch. 2000) (applying
Unocal to "proxy put" provisions in severance agreements and a credit agreement); see
also Mark H. Mixon, Jr., Comment, Regulating Proxy Puts: A Proposal to Narrow the
Proper Purpose of Proxy Puts After Sandridge, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1313, 1355 (2015)
(distinguishing between debt covenants that address "Identity Risk" and those that
address "Event Risk").
47 See SandridgeEnergy, 68 A.3d at 258-59.
48 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). Because
of the process nature of the first prong, some commenters have noted its strong
similarity to a duty of care inquiry. See Thompson & Smith, supra note 37, at 282-83
(arguing that the showing that a board "had reasonable grounds for believing there
was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness" is very similar to the showing
required to rebut the business judgment rule).
49 See Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 345-46 (Del. Ch.
2010) (holding that "[allthough its process was not ideal" when adopting the poison
pill, the board was "appropriately informed" and guided by both independent
directors and outside legal advisors).
50 See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797-98 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (outlining when a hostile bid is threatening to the corporation, threatening
to the voluntariness of a shareholder's decision to tender, and threatening to the
economic interests of the shareholders).
5' See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373. The threat may be from a hostile tender offer of a
proxy contest threat to elect outside directors. See Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 345-46.
52 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) ("Here,
the threat posed was viewed by the Unocal board as a grossly inadequate two-tier
coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail.").
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Legitimate shareholder rights plans can forestall tender offers, but
they may not preclude them. In fact, later cases seem to focus less on
the magnitude of the threat than on whether the defensive tactic is
preclusive, suggesting that a preclusive tactic is disproportionate to
most threats. 53 In other words, a shareholder rights plan should leave
open the possibility that, even with the pill in place, a bidder could
54
launch a successful proxy contest and replace the board of directors.
Additionally, a newly appointed board (or a board converted to the
vision of the bidder) must be able to redeem a shareholder rights plan
under the terms of the plan. The simultaneous existence of a staggered
board may lengthen the number of months necessary for a proxy
contest to be successful in changing the board, but this structure does
not make a poison pill preclusive; however, a shareholder rights plan
55
that may not be redeemed by the board might be.

The ultimate decision to uphold the board's actions in Unocal, while
simultaneously purporting to subject the decision and future similar
ones to greater scrutiny, may have foreshadowed the ultimate success
of board-adopted 56 poison pills. 57 Currently, shareholder rights plans
53 See Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 336 (characterizing Moran and Unitrin as ultimately
being concerned with whether a poison pill, together with any related defensive
arsenal, "was preclusive in the precise sense of making it unrealistic for an insurgent
to win a proxy contest").
54 See Thompson & Smith, supra note 37, at 292-93 (arguing that the
"proportionality" prong was not particularly suited to judicial review and so evolved
in Unitrin into the question of "whether the defensive measures were (1) coercive or
preclusive or (2) outside the range of reasonableness"); see also Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1386-88.
55 Therefore, "dead hand" and "no-hand" poison pills are suspect. See Quickturn
Design Sys., Inc., v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1289, 1291-92 (Del. 1998) (holding that
a delayed redemption provision barring a newly elected board from redeeming the
Rights Plan for six months is invalid if the purpose is to facilitate a transaction with an
"interested person"); Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1190, 1192 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (rejecting a "dead hand" rights plan).
56 Notably, the Unocal test applies to shareholder challenges of decisions of a
board of directors adopting or refusing to redeem shareholder rights plans. A poison
pill adopted by the non-bidding shareholders would seem to be impervious to a
bidder's challenge under a similar duty of loyalty analysis. In Canada, Securities
Commissions frequently refuse to uphold shareholder rights plans, even when
adopted by non-bidding shareholders out of concern for the public interest. See Notice
of National Policy 62-202 and Rescission of National Policy Statement No. 38 Take-Over
Bids Defensive Tactics (1997), 20 O.S.C. Bull. 3525 (Can.), http://www.osc.
gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw pol_19970704_62-202 fnp.jsp; HudBay Minerals, Inc.
and Augusta Resource Corp., 2014 B.C. Sec. Com. 154 (Can.) (citing a nonexhaustive
list of factors as to when a poison pill should be invalidated, including "whether
shareholder approval of the rights plan was obtained," "when the plan was adopted,"
"whether there is broad shareholder support for the continued operation of the plan,"
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may be used creatively for numerous purposes, including "to respond
to an underpriced bid, counter the tender offeror's timing and
informational advantages, and force the hostile acquirer to negotiate
with the board" and also to "protect the value of a corporate asset" or
"block a creeping takeover." 5 8 Until recently, courts seemed to
recognize a line over which a board, in refusing to redeem a
shareholder rights plan, could not cross. 59 At some point in time, a
poison pill would have either worked to attract higher bidders or force
an original bidder to raise the price60 and correct any coercive
qualities 6' of the tender offer; shareholders would have had time to
and "the likelihood that, if given further time, the target company will be able to find a
better bid or transaction"). In Australia, boards of directors may not adopt a
shareholder rights plan without stockholder approval. See Miramar Police Officers'
Ret. Plan v. Murdoch, No. 9860-CB, 2015 WL 1593745, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 7,

2015).
57 See Thompson & Smith, supra note 37, at 284-85 (presenting data that from
1985-2000, in every case analyzing defensive tactics under Unocal, the Delaware
Supreme Court never "found defensive tactics to be disproportionate outside of a
Revlon context"); see also Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 259 (Del.
Ch. 2013) ("Of course, the mere fact that the court uses a heightened reasonableness
standard does not mean that the directors will fail to satisfy it."); Goggin v.
Vermillion, Inc., No. 6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2011)
("Delaware courts have repeatedly approved of the adoption of a rights plan.").
58 See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 29 (Del. Ch. 2010).
59 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 862 (2006) (praising the Unocal test for striking
the right balance between accountability and authority and noting that "[o]nly if the
directors had the ultimate decision-making authority, rather than the incumbent
management, will the board's conduct pass muster").
60 See Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans:Understanding
Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (2012) (arguing that the authors'
models "suggest that poison pills enable target shareholders to extract value from
acquirers by empowering corporate insiders. Even though these insiders are unfaithful
agents of the shareholders, their superior information and higher reservation price can
ultimately redound to the shareholders' benefit.").
61 The seminal poison pill cases, Unocal and Moran, featured 1980s-style two-tier
coercive bids designed to motivate shareholders to tender early at a high price or be
squeezed out at a lower price or with less attractive consideration, such as junk bonds.
Cf. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 116 (Del. Ch.
1986) (holding the bid in question to be structurally coercive). Perhaps because of
regulatory amendments to the Williams Act requiring all tendering shareholders to
receive the best price offered, and partial tender offers to purchase tendered shares pro
rata, the two-tier bid has been absent from the tender offer scene for a while. Modem
cases involve straightforward offers, which, particularly if all-cash offers for all shares,
can only be seen as a "threat" if inadequate in price. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 56-57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (describing the theory of
"substantive coercion" created by a "non-discriminatory, all-cash, all-shares, fully
financed offer").
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evaluate a bidder's proposal and any board response; and a board
would have had time to formulate a competing strategy. At that time,
if the only threat the final offer poses is that shareholders will follow
their own judgment instead of the board's, then the poison pill,
depriving shareholders of that choice, may be a disproportionate
63
response. 62 After Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,
however, boards may be able to "just say no." 64
C.

Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.

Though early cases emphasized that a poison pill must be
reasonable in relation to a tender offer that the board rationally and
reasonably believes is threateningly "inadequate" and "coercive,"65
case law has developed to allow a board to use the tactic when a
hostile tender offer poses a legitimate threat to the corporate
enterprise. 66 Though the rationale for the poison pill was initially
grounded in giving shareholders time to evaluate tender offers in light
of developing information, including analysis of the board of directors
regarding the offer and even juggling competing offers, the poison pill
has become justified in terms of board discretion and power. Poison
pills should work to eliminate shareholders' lack of information and
vulnerability to coercion, but after some amount of time, the board
should allow the shareholders to vote on whether to continue to ward
off a bidder. At some point, the "threat" inherent in the tender offer
62 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988)
("Perhaps there is a case in which it is appropriate for a board of directors to in effect
permanently foreclose their shareholders from accepting a noncoercive offer .... [A]
review of the facts here show this [case] not to be it.").
63 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 129 (stating explicitly that the "case does not endorse
'just say never"' but allows such action by boards acting in "good faith and in
accordance with their fiduciary duties").
64 See Thompson & Smith, supra note 37, at 315 (predicting in 2001 that case law
precedents were moving in such a direction that a "just say no" defense might be
upheld in "a context in which a board of directors attempts to stonewall a hostile
takeover bid indefinitely").
65 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (upholding a firstgeneration rights plan that benefitted non-acquiring shareholders at the expense of
diluting the acquiring shareholder, Mesa Petroleum).
66 See Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of
Takeover Law, 29 IOwAJ. CORP. L. 103, 167-71 (2003) (arguing that a board should
have more power to defend against a bid that the board identifies as a threat to
"preexisting business plan or strategy adopted by the target board" than against a bid
the board identifies as inadequate). Note that in cases involving the use of defensive
tactics against a proxy contest, the non-monetary threat is always to corporate
strategy.
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should become minimal - the bidder will raise an inadequate price,
shareholders will be able to evaluate whether the price is inadequate
- and the defensive mechanism of a poison pill would then become
disproportionate. However, courts have recently allowed the board to
decide not only when but also if the company is for sale, even in the
face of a non-coercive, above-market, all-cash offer.
To this point, the Delaware Chancery Court somewhat reluctantly
upheld a poison pill in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,67
which held off an open tender offer for twelve months, during which
time shareholders were given ample opportunity to evaluate the offer
and no competing bids appeared. 68 Though the court answered
emphatically that "[a] board cannot just say no' to a tender offer," the
court found that the Airgas board met its Unocal burden. 69 The threat
the board identified was an inadequate price, and the poison pill was
"within a range of reasonable responses proportionate to that threat."
Though the Court of Chancery did not want to foreclose a situation in
which the Delaware courts would not support a board maintaining a
poison pill indefinitely in the face of a tender offer, finding such a
situation seems to be in the hands of the Delaware Supreme Court in a
future case. 70 However, the theory under which the board is able to
continue to use defensive tactics to protect the shareholders from
nothing more than an opportunity to make a fully informed decision
about their own investment seems unpersuasive. 7t
67 See Airgas, 16 A.3d at 57-58 (reasoning that though "Airgas's poison pill has

served its legitimate purpose," the court would not "substitute [its] business judgment
for that of the Airgas board"); see also Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products
v. Airgas and the Value of StrategicJudicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
502, 503 (2012) ("While Delaware Chancery Court judges had been indicating for
years that they were inclined to force the redemption of a shareholder rights plan in
similar circumstances, the Delaware Supreme Court had signaled its contrary
inclinations earlier in the fall of 2010.").
68 See Airgas, 16 A.3d. at 57 (reflecting that the Airgas poison pill "served its
legitimate purpose" by giving the company "more time than any litigated poison pill in
Delaware history" to raise the bid by $10 per share, to inform shareholders about the
target board's corporate strategy and to give them "four quarters of improving
financial results" (emphasis in original)).
69 Id. at 54-55.
70 See id. at 55, 57 ("1 am constrained by Delaware Supreme Court precedent to
conclude that defendants have met their burden under Unocal to articulate a sufficient
threat that justifies the continued maintenance of Airgas's poison pill."); Davidoff,
supra note 67, at 504-05 (suggesting that Chancellor Chandler "made the strategic
decision to express his dissatisfaction with this ruling" in hopes that the Supreme
Court would then be forced to refine its poison pill jurisprudence and noting that the
Airgas case could be easily distinguished and limited to its own facts).
71 Whether or not the Air Products' final bid for Airgas was substantively coercive
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Following Airgas, boards of directors seem to face little scrutiny
from ex-post challenges to adoptions of shareholder rights plans and
decisions not to redeem in the face of a committed bidder. 72 Only exante strategies by shareholders, such as anti-pill charter provisions and
shareholder agreements, would seem to place real boundaries on
board behavior. 73 However, negotiating these types of agreements or
charter amendments is difficult for widely-dispersed shareholders and

as inadequate is open to debate. In November 2015, Air Liquide and Airgas entered
into an acquisition agreement whereby Air Liquide would purchase the company for
$143 per share. Maria Armental & Alison Sider, Air Liquide to Buy Airgas for $10.3
Billion, WALL STREET J., Nov. 17, 2015, at Bi. Though this price represents a 104%
increase over the $70 offer from 2010, the S&P 500 index has also increased during
the same time period, though not as dramatically. See S&P 500 (AGSPC): Historical
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/l%5EGSPC/history?periodl=
FIN.,
YAHOO!
Data,
1291622400&period2=1447660800&interval=ld&filter=history&frequency=ld (showing
that from the opening of markets on December 1, 2010 to the closing on November
16, 2015, the S&P 500 Index increased 73.03%).
72 But see La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Fertitta, No. 4339-VCL, 2009 WL
2263406, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss breach of duty
of loyalty action against a board from not using a poison pill to thwart major
shareholder's "creeping" acquisition of control without a premium, stating "[tihe
failure to act in the face of an obvious threat to the corporation and the minority
stockholders instead supports a reasonable inference that the board breached its duty
of loyalty in choosing not to cross Fertitta").
73 See Miramar Police Officers' Ret. Plan v. Murdoch, No. 9860-CB, 2015 WL
1593745, at *2 (Del. Ch. April 7, 2015) (stating that under Delaware law, boards may
implement shareholder rights plans "at any time without stockholder approval,
subject to the directors' fiduciary duties, any limitations in the corporation's charter or
bylaws, and any restrictions in a valid and enforceable agreement to which the
corporation is a party"). In Murdoch, the court was asked to determine whether a
settlement agreement between shareholders and the board of one corporation
restricting the board's ability to maintain a shareholder rights plan for longer than one
year was binding on a subsequently created and spun-off subsidiary whose shares
were distributed to the original shareholders. See id. at *3,*7-13 (holding that newly
created subsidiary was not bound by the settlement agreement); see also In re Sirius
XM S'holder Litig., No. 7800-CS, 2013 WL 5411268, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2013)
(refusing to entertain remaining shareholders' argument that the board breached its
fiduciary duty by adhering to Investment Agreement with large investor not to adopt a
poison pill or other tactic to thwart its potential future acquisitions of Sirius XM
stock). Note that in Sirius, then Vice-Chancellor Strine pointed out that the
shareholders could have challenged the board's decision to enter into the Investment
Agreement at the time it was executed, but that any challenge was then time-barred.
Vice-Chancellor Strine did not opine as to whether such a challenge would have been
successful, but the court did note that at the time of the Investment Agreement, Sirius
desperately needed the infusion of capital and that the agreement was arms-length. See
id. at *4-5, *7.
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boards; these types of restrictions on board power can occur during
settlement negotiations or between the board and large investors. 74
As much as Airgas seems to validate a board's decision to keep a
garden-variety poison pill in place indefinitely, the case's true
importance cannot be stated without referring to a case decided six
months earlier: Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc. 75 If Airgas
stands for the proposition that a board may be able to "just say no,"
then the ruling by the Delaware Supreme Court in Selectica seems to
answer the question of "how low can the board go" 76 in setting the
percentage ownership trigger for a poison pill. 77 The poison pill in

question was a newer creation, a "tax benefits preservation plan," and
the articulated threat that this defensive tactic was designed to combat
is the intentional or inadvertent triggering of section 382 of the tax
code, which would eliminate certain valuable tax assets.
II.

LIMITATIONS ON NET OPERATING Loss CARRYFORWARDS

To understand the tax benefits preservation plan, or NOL poison
pill, some explanation of net operating losses and net operating loss
carryforward is necessary.
A.

Section 172 - Net OperatingLoss Carryforwards

The U.S. tax regime is based on net income, which allows for
deduction of losses against income. 78 Net operating losses 79 are
available to a taxpayer corporation in subsequent years, should a
corporation not have taxable income with which to offset those losses
in a given year.80 Section 172 of the Code allows a taxpayer to carry
back losses for the immediately preceding two taxable years and carry
74 See D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering
with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 130 (2011) ("Given the obstacles, it
is not surprising that shareholders in public corporations rarely enter into governance
contracts with each other or with the corporation, aside from the two organizational
documents of the corporation: the charter and the bylaws.").
75 Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
76 See Even et al., supra note 39.
77 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 589 (upholding a board's decision to adopt, maintain,
and trigger a poison pill with a 4.99% trigger).
78 See generally Jacob Nussim & Avraham Tabbach, Tax-Loss Mechanisms, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1509 (2014) (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of treating losses
as deductions or credits).
79 I.R.C. § 172(c) (2012) (defining a "net operating loss" as "the excess of the
deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income").
80 See id. § 172(b)(1)(A).
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over remaining losses for the next twenty taxable years. 81 Unused
portions of NOLs may continue to be used in each taxable year up to
the twentieth year following the taxable year in which the loss
occurred. 82 The historical reason for allowing NOL carryovers is
sound: projects or businesses of a taxpayer have a lifespan that does
not fit into a regular fiscal year of twelve months.83 Losses may occur
before profits on the same project; therefore, allowing the losses to be
usable at the time the project becomes profitable allows for offset
without either creating a refund in earlier years or losing the ability to
offset the loss completely. 84 To that end, notwithstanding the arbitrary
twelve-month reporting period, operating losses may be carried
forward or back. 85 However, the ability to use current NOLs to shelter
past and future income has varied greatly over the years, with
Congress extending, contracting and eliminating periods for both
86
carrybacks and carryforwards.
For the past century, courts and legislators have questioned whether
an acquiring corporation should be able to use NOL carryovers that
belonged to the target corporation after the target had been subsumed
and extinguished as a separate entity. 87 Though surviving corporations
81 Id. ("Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a net operating loss for
any taxable year (i) shall be a net operating loss carryback to each of the 2 taxable
years preceding the taxable year of such loss, and (ii) shall be a net operating loss
carryover to each of the 20 taxable years following the taxable year of the loss.").
82 Id. § 172(b)(2) ("The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the
other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum
of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years to which such loss may be
carried.").
83 See Daniel L. Simmons, Net Operating Losses and Section 382: Searching for a
Limitation on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1989) ("The original
[382]'s avowed purpose was to mitigate the harshness of the annual accounting
system that otherwise allowed the taxpayer to offset only the current year's income
with net losses.").
84 Note that various theories of income may treat individual taxpayers and
corporate taxpayers differently with regard to averaging income over time horizons.
See Mark Hoenig, Trafficking in Net OperatingLosses: What's So Bad?, 145 TAx NOTES
919, 922 (2014) (explaining the theory that corporations as legal fictions that do not
bear the ultimate losses or reap the rewards of successes).
85 Under l.R.C. § 172, a corporation can "carry back" its net operating losses to
the previous two tax years and "carry over" for the next twenty years to offset taxable
income. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (2012). Specific types of taxpayers are allowed to carry
back for five tax years. Id. § 172(b)(1)(F). In addition, NOLs from 2008 and 2009
were also given extended carryback periods. Id. § 172(b)(1)(H) (repealed 2014).
86 See Hoenig, supra note 84, at 920.
87 See HOWARD E. ABRAMS, RICHARD L. DOERNBERG & DON A. LEATHERMAN, FEDERAL

CORPORATE TAXATION

347 (7th ed. 2013) ("Congress has since 1954 wrestled with the
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and acquiring corporations succeed to all assets and liabilities of the
target corporation, 88 the purchasing of a tax asset was seen as
frustrating the purpose of the carryover rule. On one end of the
spectrum, regulators may not want taxpayers to be able to transfer tax
benefits from one entity to another, 89 but on the other end of the
spectrum, regulators may also feel wary about allowing the same entity
to enjoy the tax benefits when the entity has new owners. 90 Though
equity may support having an entity use current losses from various
projects to offset future profits from those projects, once an entity is
acquired, those projects may be ended. 91 In the worst-case scenario, a
defunct or insolvent business with an abandoned business plan may be
purchased solely for its NOL tax asset.92 Acquisitions with the primary
perceived problem of 'trafficking' in NOLs.").
8

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107(a) (2016) ("Upon merger pursuant to this.

chapter the separate existence of the disappearing corporations ceases and the
surviving corporation shall succeed, without other transfer, to all the rights and
property of each of the disappearing corporations and shall be subject to all the debts
and liabilities of each in the same manner as if the surviving corporation had itself
incurred them."); DEL. CODE ANN. it. 8, § 259(a) (2016) ("When any merger or
consolidation shall have become effective under this chapter... all property, rights,
privileges, powers and franchises, and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as
effectually the property of the surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the
several and respective constituent corporations .. ");TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 10.008(a) (2016) ("When a merger takes effect: ...(2) all rights, title, and interests
to all real estate and other property owned by each organization that is a party to the
merger is allocated to and vested, subject to any existing liens or other encumbrances
on the property, in one or more of the surviving or new organizations as provided in
the plan of merger without: (A) reversion or impairment; (B) any further act or deed;
or (C) any transfer or assignment having occurred ....
").
89 See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 441 (1934) (disallowing
carryovers for corporation that was reorganized under a new charter, even with the
same business and same shareholders).
90 See Lisbon Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 390 (1957) (applying a
predecessor to current section 382 to a new loss corporation after seventeen separate
corporations were merged into one because income "was not produced by
substantially the same businesses which incurred the losses"). These regulatory
choices are just one set that could be made. One could also argue that tax benefits
should be freely transferable, but that is not the topic of this Article.
91 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 87, at 347 ("On one hand, the carryover
provisions perform an averaging function that allows corporations to overcome the
limits of our annual accounting system. On the other hand, where NOLs are used to
offset totally unrelated income (such as the acquisition of a corporation solely to
obtain its NOLs), no legitimate averaging function seems to be performed.").
92 Arguably, this outcome is not absolutely unjust. The increased purchase price
for the tax assets will repay selling shareholders for the loss of their capital. However,
to the extent that the purchaser and seller split the value of the tax assets and the
purchaser retains some value, then the Treasury could be said to be subsidizing the
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purpose of purchasing NOLs were deemed suspect as "trafficking" in a
tax asset.
B.

Section 382 - Limitations on NOL Carryovers

1. Acquisitions as Trafficking in NOL Tax Assets
Acquisitions of a target corporation by a separate corporation occur
for a variety of good and bad reasons, from operational synergy to
managerialism. The amalgam of Company A and Company B may be
greater than the sum of its parts,93 not only because of economies of
scale and scope. The managers of Company A may be more skilled
than the managers of Company B at utilizing the assets of Company B.
In this situation, those new managers may "redeploy" the assets by
selling them for more than the full purchase price of Company B.94 On
a more cynical note, the new managers may merely have wanted to
make an acquisition of Company B to increase their own fiefdoms and
demand more compensation. 95 Or, Company A may have wanted to
eliminate a competitor and move prices higher. 96 In another scenario,
B, and
Company A may have want to hire the employees of Company
9z
an acquisition seemed the easiest way to accomplish that feat.
Company A may also wish to acquire Company B for certain tax
attributes. In the absence of regulation, Company B may be
unprofitable, but may still command a premium for its shares if
Company A could use its unused NOLs to shelter Company A's
transaction. See Simmons, supra note 83, at 1061. This recoupment theory competes
with an opposing theory that recoupment subsidizes failing businesses. See id. at 1069.
93 See

PETER V.

LETSOU,

CORPORATE

MERGERS

AND

ACQUISITIONS

4 (2006)

(describing the "synergy" explanation for firm combinations).
94 See Timothy M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the Rise of

Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, I J. Bus. & TECH. L. 185, 191 (2006) ("[M]any
believed that a conglomerate could improve the operations of a company simply by
acquiring it and adding it to the conglomerate's existing network of managerial
techniques and resources.").
95 See Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporationfor the
Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 519-20 (1993) (discussing the managerialism
theory that managers will "pursue corporate growth to maximize their own utility");
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 706-07 (identifying certain control
transactions that do not produce gains, such as acquisitions for "the selfaggrandizement of buyers" and "looting").
96 See Hurley, supra note 94, at 195 ("The direct acquisition of another
corporation is one of the most effective ways a company can increase its economic
power.").
97 See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DuKE L. J. 281, 294
(2013).
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income. In the hands of Company B, the NOLs are virtually worthless,
but in the hands of New Company AB, the NOLs are valuable.
However, under a theory that acquisitions should be tax-neutral, i.e.,
companies should engage in acquisitions based on non-tax factors,
with the tax code neither encouraging or discouraging the acquisition,
Congress and the IRS have continually stressed through statute and
regulation that acquirers may not traffic in or benefit from the NOLs
of the acquired. 98 Under current law, in the event of the acquisition of
Company B under most circumstances, the unused NOLs, no matter
how large, will be subject to a substantial annual limitation to
Company A. 99

Whether or not acquisitions for the primary purpose of succeeding
to the loss carryovers of a target should be prohibited is an open
question. Taxpayers engage in a number of economic activities with
tax planning purposes that are not prohibited. Furthermore, if the
acquirer and target calculate the value of the carryovers in the hands
of the acquirer into the purchase price, then the shareholders of the
target should be compensated for the use of the NOLs.100 If, as one
argument proceeds, the taxpayers that suffered the economic loss
triggering the loss carryover should be the only ones who may receive
the economic benefit of the carryover, then the purchase price ensures
that this happens. The acquirer will be able to have an economic
benefit from the carryovers in later years, but the acquirer presumably
purchased that benefit. 101

Courts at first looked to whether the corporate form of the target or
the acquirer was extinguished, then moved to a more substantive
98 See William M. Davidow, Jr., Limitations Imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986
on a Corporation'sUse of Net OperatingLoss CarryoversAfter an Ownership Change, 17
U. BALT. L. REV. 331, 335 (1988) (describing the argument in the Senate Finance
Committee Report that the law prior to the 1986 tax reforms was too lax in allowing
acquiring corporations to achieve free transferability of tax benefits).
99 See Annette M. Ahlers, Section 382 Issues Raised in an Acquisition of a Loss
Corporationby a Private Equity Group, 2012 TAX UPDATE, no. 4 (Pepper Hamilton LLP,
Los
Angeles,
Cal.),
http://documents.lexology.com/393bl 75c-b8fe-48b1-b54dbba990a46733.pdf ("While it may seem tantalizing to a buyer to see $100 million in
NOLs on the books of a potential target company, it will take a significant amount of
due diligence and analysis to assess whether those NOLs will have value to a private
equity buyer.").
100 This equation may not be perfectly balanced, however. If the target is selling a
benefit worth $100x in the hands of the acquirer but worth $Ox in the hands of the
target, the target may rationally accept any price between $Ox and $100x for the
benefit. However, if there are numerous bidders, the price should approach $100x.
101 Again, the purchase price may not fully reflect the value of the tax benefit in the
hands of the acquirer.

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 50:137

"continuity of business" test. 10 2 Congress attempted to codify specific
rules that would govern when acquiring corporations could use NOLs
of an extinguished target in both the Revenue Act of 1943,103 1954

amendments to the Code, 10 4 and the Tax Reform Act of 1976.105
Eventually, Congress arguably clarified the issue with new Internal
Revenue Code section 382 as part of the 1986 tax reforms. 06 Section
382 creates complex rules limiting the use by acquirers of NOL
carryovers of target corporations. 10 7 As long as the new corporation
continues the business enterprise of the old corporation, the NOLs do
not disappear, but their use is limited to the value of the target at the
10 8
time of the acquisition multiplied by the risk-free rate of return.
This formula is intended to mimic the value of the NOLs to the target,
taking into account the probability that the target would be able to use
the NOLs before expiration. 10 9 In other words, this formula is
See Hoenig, supra note 84, at 926.
Revenue Act of 1943, § 129, 56 Stat. 856 (current version at I.R.C. § 269(a)
(2012)) (disallowing the use of NOLs by an acquiring company if "the principal
purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal
income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which
such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy").
104 Adding new sections 381 and 382, which, working together, allowed for the use
of historical NOLs in certain tax-free reorganizations and in others as long as there
was some continuity of the historical business. See Hoenig, supra note 84, at 925 n.35
("Despite the articulated goal in the Senate report, the statute clearly permitted
complete survival and use of the loss carryovers as long as some part of the old loss
corporation business was continued, and it permitted the use of those surviving losses
to offset not only the historical business's income, but also to offset income from new
businesses.").
105 Because of delays in implementation of the 1976 amendments to section 382,
few provisions were ever effective before their repeal in 1986. See Hoenig, supra note
84, at 927 (explaining that various provisions were effective in 1984 while some were
due to take effect on January 1, 1986, the year of their repeal).
106 I.R.C. § 382(a) (2012) ("The amount of the taxable income of any new loss
corporation for any post-change year which may be offset by pre-change losses shall
not exceed the section 382 limitation for such year."). Section 382 creates a regime
under which all NOLs will be lost to the new loss corporation if there is no
"continuity of business enterprise," and NOLs will be drastically limited if there is. Id.
§ 382(c)(1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2), if the new loss corporation does
not continue the business enterprise of the old loss corporation at all times during the
2-year period beginning on the change date, the section 382 limitation for any postchange year shall be zero.").
107 See id. § 382(b)(1) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, the section
382 limitation for any post-change year is an amount equal to (A) the value of the old
loss corporation, multiplied by (B) the long-term tax-exempt rate.").
108 See id.
109 See DAVID ELKINS, BEHIND THE SCENES OF CORPORATE TAXATION 608 (2013) ("The
102
103
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intended to make the parties' incentives to sell the target and purchase
the target neutral as to the NOLs.11 0
Section 382 applies not only to transactions normally considered
acquisitions, but also to any "ownership change" which may or may
not result in a change in control from one person or group to another.
To risk oversimplifying a complex determination, if one or more
shareholders with five percent (5%) or more ownership of a company
increases that ownership percentage by 50 percentage points in three
years, then an ownership change triggering the rule occurs."' The
easiest example is an outsider shareholder (an individual or another
entity, Company B) purchasing shares in Company A for the first time
in 2013, then purchasing additional shares, resulting in an ownership
percentage of 51% by 2015.112 This rule ensures not only that an
acquirer will not purchase a failing company merely for tax assets, but
also that the acquirer cannot effectuate the same result with creeping
purchases over a relatively short time period. Another easy illustration
of ownership change occurs when Company A acquires or merges
with Company B.113 In certain circumstances, Company B and
Company A could achieve a tax-free reorganization that did not result

idea behind the section 382 limitation is that Congress did not want the new loss
corporation to be able to deduct the NOL more quickly than the pace at which the old
corporation would have been able to deduct it.").
110 See Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking:
Section 382 and High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REv. 625, 639-40 (1990)
(referring to this approach as the "neutrality principle").
LL See I.R.C. § 382(g)(1) (2012) ("There is an ownership change if, immediately
after any owner shift involving a 5-percent shareholder or any equity shift (A) the
percentage of the stock of the loss corporation owned by 1 or more 5-percent
shareholders has increased by more than 50 percentage points, over (B) the lowest
percentage of stock of the loss corporation (or any predecessor corporation) owned by
such shareholders at any time during the testing period.").
112 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(c)(2) (2007) (as amended by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986). The first example presents "C" purchasing all the shares of "A" and "B"
in corporation "L." A and B each owned 40% of L, with 20% owned by unrelated
individuals. Id. "C's acquisition of 80 percent of L stock results in an ownership
change because C's percentage ownership has increased by 80 percentage points as of
the testing date, compared to his lowest percentage ownership in L at any time during
the testing period (0 percent)." Id.
113 See id. § 1.382-2T(e)(2)(iv) ex. 1. A owns 100% of the stock of L, and B owns
100% of the stock of P. L and P effectuate a tax-free reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A), with P the surviving corporation. A owns 25% of P, and B owns 75% of
P following the merger. An ownership change has resulted with respect to P (B's
ownership percentage in the new loss corporation has increased by 75 percentage
points over his lowest percentage of stock ownership in L, zero), so any pre-change
losses of L are subject to limitation. Id
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in an ownership change if the original shareholders of Company A, the
loss corporation, have resulting ownership percentages in the new
company that do not cross the 50% threshold. 114 Finally, many
corporations are able to retain their NOLs if a reorganization takes
115
place during a bankruptcy proceeding.
If in any of these examples an ownership change has occurred,
Company A will lose all of the NOL carryovers if Company A does not
continue the business enterprise; but if it does, then it will then
encounter a "382 limitation." Under the 382 limitation, Company A
can only use the NOL carryovers in an amount equal to the value of
the company as calculated by the value of its outstanding stock,
multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate, which is currently
2.65%.116 If Company A had 100x NOLs and outstanding stock worth
100x, then the acquiring company can use 2.8x NOLs in the first year,
with 97.2x as a NOL carryover for the next year. 117 Note that an
ownership change that causes a 382 limitation affects large
corporations much less than it would affect a small corporation. For
example, if Citigroup were to encounter an "ownership change," then
that would limit the corporation to using a little over $3 billion a year
l 8
in NOL carryovers."
In many of these scenarios, the management or at least a major
shareholder has control over whether a purchasing decision will be
made to trigger the limitation of the NOL carryovers. The company
will decide whether to be acquired, whether to be merged into another
corporation or whether to engage in other "equity structure shift," 119
transactions that can trigger a 382 limitation such as a public

114 See id. § 1.382-2T(e)(2)(iv) ex. 2 (showing that under similar circumstances,
the pre-change losses of the surviving corporation may still be used without limitation
because there has not been an increase in 50 percentage points in the ownership of A
or B in the surviving corporation).
115 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G) (2012); Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy's Corporate
Tax Loophole, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2273, 2295-97 (2014).
116 Rev. Rul. 2016-4, 2016-6 l.R.B. 300 tbl. 3 (stating the long-term tax-exempt rate

for ownership changes for February 2016).
117 See ELKINS, supra note 109, at 608-10 (providing an example of an $8 million loss
corporation with an NOL of $7.5 million). Following an ownership change, the new loss
corporation would have a 382 limitation in each taxable year equal to $8 million
multiplied by a hypothetical 3% long-term tax-exempt rate, or $240,000. 11 at 610.
118 As of February 19, 2016, the market capitalization of Citigroup, Inc. is over
$115 billion. Multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt interest rate for this month, the
382 limitation would be $3.05 billion per year.
119 I.R.C. § 382(g)(3) (2012) ("equity structure shift" defined as any of certain
types of 368 reorganizations).
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offering.120 However, management-triggered scenarios are not the only
situations in which section 382 operate. A shareholder or group of
shareholders may inadvertently cause an "ownership change," after an
"owner shift,"121 particularly in a corporation with concentrated
ownership and a small capitalization. In addition, a 382 limitation may
be triggered by a bad faith shareholder, triggering an ownership
change by making creeping open market purchases. Such an
occurrence would be a lose-lose situation for the corporation: none of
the benefits of a merger or influx of capital, but all of the downside of
losing a valuable tax asset.
For example, a hostile tender offer executed by a potential acquirer
could trigger the limitations of section 382 if, as a group, the bidder
and other 5% shareholders increase their aggregate holdings by 50
percentage points within three years. If any 5% shareholder, whether
hostile acquirer, insider or otherwise, causes an "owner shift," then
this triggers an inquiry as to whether the corporation experienced an
"ownership change" over the three years ending on the date of the
owner shift.122 Moreover, an ownership change will occur if during
that three-year period, a group of 5% shareholders in the aggregate
increase their ownership percentages by more than 50 percentage
points. 123 For example, if ten shareholders began the period with 4%
ownership, but each separately increased their ownership to 9.5%,
then section 382 would be triggered by this "ownership change."1 24
Theoretically, this means that multiple shareholders could
independently and unknowingly trigger section 382. Because of the
possibility of such an occurrence, section 382 requires companies to
track which shareholders own 5% or more of the company. And,
because of this possibility, corporations may have an interest in

120 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(e)(1)(iii) ex. 5 (2007) (as amended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986) (giving, as an example, a corporation with 1 million
outstanding shares conducting a public offering of 2 million shares to new
shareholders, none of whom own 5%; however, all the public shareholders are treated
as one 5% shareholder group, which increased its percentage ownership from zero to
66.67%, triggering an ownership change).
121 See 1.R.C. § 382(g)(2).
122 Id. § 382(g)(1). Note that all shareholders holding less than 5% of the
ownership of a corporation are treated as one 5% shareholder in calculating whether
an ownership change has occurred. Id. § 382(g)(4)(A).
123 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(c)(4) (as amended by the Tax Reform Act of
1986).
124 See I.R.C. § 382(g)(1). Each shareholder would be treated as a 5% shareholder,
and an ownership change would be determined by calculating the net increase in each
shareholder's ownership from its lowest level during the testing period. Id.
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ensuring that shareholders do not accidentally trigger section 382 and
limit the future use of NOL carryovers. To ward against an inadvertent
ownership change, a board may propose that shareholders approve an
amendment to the articles of incorporation to restrict transfers,
25
allowing the board to void transfers that jeopardize the NOLs.1
However, the hostile bidder scenario should be limited to a small
group of firms: publicly-traded firms with small capitalization,
concentrated in the hands of relatively few shareholders.
If regulators were particularly concerned with curbing tax-motivated
acquisitions, then section 382 may have the (intended or unintended)
consequence of prohibiting harmless shareholder purchases with taxneutral purposes and no change of control effects. However, whether
inadvertent shareholder purchases pose a tangible problem to many
firms seems to be an open question. 126 Though boards of directors
instituting defensive measures against hostile bidders argue the
plausible danger of section 382 limitations as justifying their actions,
little exists in the case law or scholarly record to indicate an ongoing
problem. In the 30 years following the tax reforms of 1986, "there
appears to be no major industry-based complaint or effort at
significant change or repeal" of section 382.127 Section 382 may seem
like a draconian rule putting publicly-held corporations constantly at
risk of losing NOLs unintentionally. However, if corporations were
truly under this threat, one would expect to see more complaints
regarding section 382.128 For instance, during the financial crisis, the
Department of Treasury issued several notices liberalizing section
382's impact, 129 including I.R.S. Notice 2008-83,130 which provided
125 See Mark C. Van Deusen, A Primeron Protecting Tax Losses from a Section 382
Ownership Change, WM. & MARY ANN. TAX CONF. 20 (2010), http://scholarship.
law.wm.edu/tax/20/.
126 Though closely-held corporations would seem to be more limited by section
382, note that an individual and that individual's spouse, parents, children, and
grandchildren will be treated as one individual, thus allowing for most intra-family
transfers without triggering an owner shift. See I.R.C. § 382(l)(3)(A).
127 Hoenig, supra note 84, at 936.
128 See generally Parker, supra note 110 (predicting in 1990 that new section 382
would create particular problems for start-up companies seeking to engage in new
financing rounds).
129 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251 (clarifying that shares that
Treasury acquired or eventually redeemed or sold under the TARP plan would not
cause an ownership change under section 382); I.R.S. Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B.
516 (providing more guidance following Notice 2008-100). The financial industry was
not the only recipient of section 382 liberalization. Congress added subsection (n) to
section 382, which states that the limitation on NOL carryovers "shall not apply in the
case of an ownership change which is pursuant to a restructuring plan of a taxpayer
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that a section 382 limitation would not apply to bank taxpayers' losses
related to loans and bad debts.13l In this instance, Treasury was
liberalizing section 382 to avoid its harshest result, but seemed to be
responding to a specific situation 132 - the need to have quick bank
consolidations in order to save struggling banks in a private market
solution. Instead of being embraced, the Notice was challenged as an
overstepping of Treasury's authority and was eventually revoked by

Congress. 133

which is required under a loan agreement or a commitment for a line of credit entered
into with the Department of the Treasury under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, and is intended to result in a rationalization of the costs,
capitalization, and capacity with respect to the manufacturing workforce of, and
suppliers to, the taxpayer and its subsidiaries." This amendment addressed the specific
case of General Motors. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government
Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 210 (2010).
130 I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905 ("For purposes of section 382(h), any
deduction properly allowed after an ownership change (as defined in section 38 2 (g))
to a bank with respect to losses on loans or bad debts (including any deduction for a
reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts) shall not be treated as a built-in loss or
a deduction that is attributable to periods before the change date.").
131 See generally Nathaniel S. Cushman, The Impact of Illegal Tax Guidance: Notice
2008-83, 62 TAx LAw. 867 (2009) (arguing that I.R.S. Notice 2008-83 was outside the
authority of Treasury because it changed section 382 rather than merely interpreting
it). Notice 2008-83 was part of a panoply of efforts of the executive and legislative
branches during the 2008 financial crisis to preserve the financial system and served
to encourage acquirers to purchase failing financial institutions or otherwise invest
large amounts of capital in them. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905. The
merger of Wells Fargo and Wachovia is often mentioned in connection with Notice
2008-83. Id. Notice 2008-100, Notice 2009-14 and Notice 2010-2 created other
exceptions for ownership changes caused by the U.S. government as an investor. See
I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251; I.R.S. Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B. 516;
I.R.S. Notice 2008-100, I.R.B. 2008-44.
132 See Block, supra note 129, at 218-20 (describing how I.R.S. Notice 2008-83 was
aimed at providing support to either Wells Fargo or Citigroup's acquisition of ailing
Wachovia and how unpopular the Notice was with legislators and commentators); see
also Leandra Lederman, What Do Courts Have to Do with It?: The Judiciary's Role in
Making Federal Tax Law, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 899, 912 (2012) (describing the backlash
against the Notice). Senator Charles Grassley requested that the Office of Inspector
General open an inquiry into I.R.S. Notice 2008-83 based on suspicions of favoritism
toward Wells Fargo, but the inquiry found no evidence of favoritism. See Rich Delmar,
Counsel to the Inspector Gen., Memo to Eric M. Thorson, Inspector Gen. (Sept. 3,
2009), https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry
%20Regarding%201RS%20Notice%202008-83.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
133 See Cushman, supra note 131, at 892 (arguing that taxpayers should not be
allowed to rely on the "illegal tax guidance" of Notice 2008-83, but the statutory
revocation did not apply retroactively and allowed for that reliance).
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The Tax Benefit Preservation Plan ("NOL Poison Pill")

The poison pill, with a 15-30% trigger, is a staple of the antitakeover arsenal that management can deploy against hostile
takeovers. Obviously, the lower the percentage ownership an acquirer
is able to amass before the poison pill is triggered, the harder it is for
the acquirer to launch a proxy fight to get enough other shareholders
to vote out management. If an acquirer can purchase 30%, then it only
has to gather holders of 21% to vote with it, and so on. But the lower
the trigger, the more difficult the "plan B" proxy fight becomes.
Notably, the availability of the "plan B" proxy fight is what makes the
poison pill reasonable and not preclusive in the eyes of the courts. The
lower the trigger, the less reasonable the poison pill would seem to be
because the "plan B" proxy fight becomes less and less realistic.
Recently, a 10% trigger on a garden-variety poison pill was blessed by
the Delaware Chancery Court, 134 representing a new level of
deference.
The NOL poison pill, or "tax benefit preservation plan," however,
has an even lower trigger. These poison pills have triggers between 4
and 5%. For this type of poison pill, the "threat" to the corporation is
articulated not as a threat to corporate strategy, or even a coercive or
inadequate tender offer. Instead, the threat is to a corporate asset, the
valuable NOLs. 135 The poison pill then operates to protect the asset by
deterring new shareholders from becoming 5% shareholders. Note that
the section 382 limitation is not triggered because a shareholder
crosses the 5% threshold; rather, 5% shareholders trigger an
examination of whether 5% shareholders as a group have increased
their holdings by more than 50 percentage points over three years.
Though 5% seems like a logical threshold, given the fact that "5%"
appears in the wording of section 382, that threshold is vastly
overinclusive.
With a garden-variety poison pill deployed against a hostile bidder
or an activist attempting a proxy contest, the poison pill has one
selling point: it works. Bidders who are looking to purchase control do
134 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *26 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2014) (upholding Sotheby's shareholder rights plan, which created a 10%
trigger for shareholders who file a Schedule 13D with the SEC, versus a 20% trigger
for shareholders who file a Schedule 13G).
135 See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the
Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. LJ. 1087, 1098 (2012)
("This new form of rights plan is designed to protect these firms' NOLs against the
possibility that share-ownership changes might cause the company to lose or limit its
ability to use its NOLs to reduce its future tax liabilities.").
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not want to be diluted after acquiring 15, 20, or 30% of a company. In
addition, if the pill were triggered, purchasing control becomes more
expensive. How an NOL poison pill actually works against the stated
threat it is designed to thwart is more unclear. The very low trigger
means the dilution affect is muted against a hostile bidder, and its
existence would not deter the inadvertent purchaser. This Article
argues that the true purpose of the NOL poison pill is to ward off
activist shareholders, who do not intend to gain control of a firm but
merely maintain a sufficiently large position to pressure management.
The first corporation to adopt an NOL poison pill did so in

December 1998.136 One year later, a second corporation followed
suit, 137 and a third in 2000.138 Three more corporations added NOL
poison pills in 2002,139 three more in 2003,140 one more in 2004,141
136 See Oakhurst Co., Inc. (now Sterling Construction Company, Inc.), Current
Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 29, 1998) (reporting the adoption of a new shareholder
rights plan with a trigger of 4.5%). Interestingly, in the SEC filing, the company does
not mention its new operating loss carryovers or the need to protect them. See id. at 7
("The Rights are designed to deal with the problem of a raider using what the Board of
Directors perceives to be coercive tactics to deprive the Company's Board of Directors
and stockholders of any real opportunity to determine the destiny of the Company by
forcing the raider to negotiate with the Company's Board of Directors.").
137 See Wilshire Real Estate Investment Trust Inc. (now Fog Cutter Capital Group
Inc.), Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 23, 1999) (reporting the adoption of a
shareholder rights plan with a trigger of 5% and reproducing a letter from Andrew A.
Wiederhorn, the CEO and Chairman of the Board, which states, "We believe that the
Stockholder Rights Plan represents a sound and reasonable means of protecting the
Company's net operating loss carry forwards.").
138 See Maxicare Health Plans, Inc., Schedule 14A Proxy Statement (June 13, 2000)
(providing shareholders with information on a proposed "Restricted Transferability of
Capital Stock" charter amendment "to provide the Company the opportunity to utilize
its net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards" and also reporting that "[in order to
further protect the Company's NOLs from the impact of an ownership change," the
Board amended the Shareholders Right Plan to lower the trigger to 5%). If a company
has a charter amendment restricting share purchases over 5%, the need for an NOL
poison pill is unclear.
139 See Softnet Sys., Inc. (now American Independence Corp.), Current Report
(Form 8-K) (July 31, 2002) (reporting that the company adopted a Preferred Share
Purchase Rights Plan with a trigger of 4.99% and that "[tihe rights are designed to
protect the tax benefits associated with the Company's net operating loss
carryforwards."); Criimi Mae Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 25, 2002)
(reporting the adoption of a shareholder rights plan with a 5% trigger, acknowledging
that "[t]he Rights have certain anti-takeover effects [and] ...[t]he Rights will cause
substantial dilution to a person or group who attempts to acquire the Company on
terms not approved by the Company's Board of Directors"); HomeGold to Carry Over
Tax Benefit, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws (Feb. 25, 2002), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/
1G1-83238552.html.

140 See BNS Holding Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 7, 2003) (reporting
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and five more in 2005.142 Of these fifteen companies, only three had a
market capitalization of over $50 million, and none more than $161
million. 143 These types of "nanocap" companies are the most at risk of
losing NOL tax assets; though their stocks are publicly traded (some
over-the-counter), their public floats are small and concentrated. An
ownership change would be easier to accomplish intentionally or
unintentionally in a nanocap company.

that the Board of Directors amended the company's Rights Agreement to lower the
trigger to 4.99% and including a press release that explained that "[tihe amendment
will assist in limiting the number of 5% or more owners and thus reduce the risk of a
possible "change of ownership" under Section 382"); Geoworks Corp. (now NCM
Services Inc.), Amendment No. 1 (Form 8-A) (May 19, 2003) (lowering the trigger of
Rights Agreement to 4.99% "to seek to prevent possible limitations on the Company's
use of its Federal net operating loss carryforwards and certain income tax credits.");
Crown Crafts, Inc., Amendment No. 1 (Form 8-A/A) (April 29, 2003) (reporting
amendments to the company's Rights Agreement as of April 29, 2003 with a trigger of
5% "to protect the Company's ability to carry forward its net operating losses
("NOLs") and, thus protect shareholder value").
141 See Wilhelmina Int'l, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 30, 2004)
(reporting that the company completed an offering of Series A Preferred Stock, and
pursuant to that transaction, amended its Shareholder Rights Agreement trigger from
15% to 5% "to ensure the preservation of the Company's net operating loss
carryforwards").
142 See Cygnus, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 17, 2005) (reporting the
adoption of a Rights Agreement with a trigger of 4.95% and including a press release
explaining that "The plan, among other things, encourages potential acquirers of
Cygnus to negotiate with the Board of Directors of Cygnus so as to enhance the
Board's ability to achieve the best possible value for all of the Company's stockholders.
The plan is also designed to protect the Company's net operating loss ("NOL")
carryforwards for tax purposes ....");CoSine Commc'ns Inc., Current Report (Form
8-K) (Sept. 8, 2005) (reporting that the company adopted a stockholders rights plan
with a trigger of 5% "to protect stockholder value by protecting the Company's
stockholders from coercive takeover practices or takeover bids that are inconsistent
with their best interests, and by protecting the Company's ability to carry forward its
net operating losses ("NOLs")."); Wheeling Pittsburgh Corp., Current Report (Form
8-K) (Feb. 18, 2005) (reporting that the company adopted a Rights Agreement with a
trigger of 4.99% so purchasers would not "jeopardize or endanger the availability to
the Company of its net operating loss carryforwards to be used to offset its taxable
income"). According to data provided by SharkRepellent, Bayou Steel Corporation and
JPS Industries, two non-reporting companies, also adopted NOL poison pills in 2005.
See SHARKREPELLENT, https://sharkrepellent.net/ (last visited July 12, 2016).
143 See infra APPENDIX A (listing 155 unique companies that adopted an NOL
poison pill between December 29, 1998 and February 27, 2014). This exhaustive list
of companies was provided by SharkRepellent. The author then hand-gathered market
capitalization data by examining SEC filings close in time to the adoption of the NOL
poison pill.
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However, the NOL poison pill soon became more widespread
among companies with various market capitalizations.144 Interestingly,
the NOL poison pill became popular among nanocap and microcap
companies and, on the other end of the spectrum, companies with
capitalizations over $1 billion. By the end of 2007, of the twenty-four
companies with NOL poison pills, twenty-two companies were
microcap or nanocap companies and two had capitalizations of over
$1 billion. 145 In a set of 155 unique corporations that adopted NOL
poison pills between 1998 and March 1, 2014, 111 could be described
as microcap (under $300 million capitalization), with sixty-six of
those being nanocap companies (under $50 million capitalization).
However, twenty-six of those 155 firms had market capitalizations of
over $1 billion at the time the NOL poison pill was adopted. 146 Part IV
will explore some explanations for this bimodal distribution of NOL
147
poison pill firms.
C.
1.

The NOL Poison Pill in the Delaware Courts

Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.

To date, the Delaware courts have been faced with only one NOL
poison pill, and the facts of that case may be fairly specific. In Versata
Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
a tax benefit preservation plan, NOL poison pill, without a threat of a
change-of-control takeover. 148 Though the purchasing shareholder,
Trilogy, had made numerous offers to acquire Selectica, the board
articulated the danger as a threat to a corporate asset because an
ownership change, under section 382, could possibly lead to the loss
of certain tax assets, NOL carryovers. 149
144 See generally infra APPENDIX A.

145 The two billion-dollar companies were USG Corporation, with a public float
held by nonaffiliates of $2.9 billion, and Charter Communications, Inc., with a public
float held by nonaffiliates of $1.5 billion. See infra APPENDIX A.
146 An additional three companies had common stock held by nonaffiliates that
amounted to just under $1 billion, suggesting that the total market capitalization for
those three was also over $1 billion. See infra APPENDIX A (Eastman Kodak Company,
$963 million; Lear Corporation, $984.7 million; The Ryland Group, Inc., $908.8
million).
147 See infra Part IV.
148 SeeVersata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
149 Id. at 594 (describing the board's adoption of the NOL poison pill to replace its
former plan with a 15% trigger after conducting a "Section 382 ownership analysis"
that revealed that within the past three years, 5% shareholders had increased their
ownership by 40 percentage points).
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Selectica, a struggling, publicly-traded microcap 150 company, had an
estimated $165 million in NOLs, 15 1 though its market capitalization
was only $23 million. 152 In addition, Selectica's outstanding stock was
concentrated in a handful of shareholders; twenty-two shareholders
owned 62% of the stock. 153 Because of substantial stock ownership and
turnover by a small number of investors, Selectica estimated that it
in
might have already lost $24.6 million of NOLs due to changes 154
ownership in the past and was reaching the 50% threshold.
However, and most importantly, a competitor and large judgment
creditor of Selectica, Trilogy, Inc. and its subsidiary, Versata
Enterprises, had increased its holdings on the open market to 6.7%
and were interested in acquiring the troubled company. 155 Following
the Trilogy purchases in Fall 2008, Selectica amended its original
Shareholder Rights Plan to lower the 15% trigger to 4.99%.156
Selectica is a notable case for a number of reasons, most remarkably
because it is the one acquisition in recent memory in which the
acquirer triggered the poison pill; moreover, the target then reset the
poison pill.'5 7 Probably because the dilution of the bidder at such a
low trigger resulted in a relatively small loss, Trilogy158was not deterred
either before or after the poison pill went into effect.
150

The court refers to Selectica as a "microcap" company. However, companies

with a capitalization of less than $50 million are referred to as "nanocap" companies.
See Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 18,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm.
151 Selectica, 5 A.3d at 592.
152

Id. at 590.

153 Id. at 603.
154 Id. at 591.
155 Id. at 596. Trilogy made two offers in the summer of 2008 for all of the assets of
Selectica: one for $6 million plus cancellation of the $7.1 million that Selectica owed
Trilogy and one for $10 million plus the cancellation of indebtedness. Id. at 593.
156 See Selectica, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 17, 2008) (including a
press release whereby the company explains that "[iun addition to protecting the
company's net operating loss carryforwards and tax credits, the amended rights plan is
designed to assure that all stockholders of the company receive fair and equal
treatment in the event of any proposed takeover of the company, to guard against twotier or partial tender offers, open market accumulations and other tactics designed to
gain control of the company without paying all stockholders a fair price, and to
enhance the board's ability to negotiate with a prospective acquirer").
157 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 598.
158 Once Trilogy's purchases triggered the poison pill, the board of Selectica had
ten business days to decide whether to let the poison pill go into effect or exempt
Trilogy. During those ten days, the Board attempted to negotiate a standstill
agreement, but Trilogy attempted to negotiate for payments related to its judgment
against Selectica, repurchase of its stock, and other valuable consideration. See
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Finally, the Delaware Court of Chancery entered a declaratory
judgment for Selectica that the board of director's decision to adopt an
NOL poison pill is valid and enforceable, and the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed that decision.'i 9 In so doing, the court employed a
Unocal analysis and found that the Selectica board reasonably
considered the possible loss of a large corporate asset such as the
NOLs a dangerous threat, thus meeting the first prong of the test. 60
Secondly, the court found that as a response to that threat, the NOL
poison pill was neither coercive or preclusive.161 The court relied on
the testimony of expert witnesses that Trilogy could still mount a
proxy contest with an ownership percentage of 4.99%, particularly
when such a contest would entail communicating with a small number
of shareholders to reach a majority. 162 Because the NOL poison pill
was not preclusive, the court then found that the tactic was within the
range of reasonable options available to the board to respond to the
threat of losing the NOLs. 163 In other words, the Delaware Supreme
Court blessed the use of a poison pill with a 4.99% trigger.
Combined with the Airgas precedent allowing boards to keep poison
pills in place for an indefinite period of time, the Selectica case seems
to portend a bleak future for activist shareholders and potential
bidders, not to mention premium-loving shareholders, if any firm with
NOLs may adopt a poison pill with a 4-5% trigger. The Selectica

Answering Brief on Appeal and Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal of Appellee/CrossAppellant at "1, Selectica, 5 A.3d 586 (No. 4241-VCN), 2010 WL 2464491. Trilogy
did not seem to value the NOL carryovers as an asset; as Selectica's largest creditor,
Trilogy might act to protect an asset of its debtor if that asset were valuable. See id.
159 See Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *25
(Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), affd, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
160 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 599-600 (finding that the board spent sufficient time on
the question and relied on outside experts).
161 See id. at 601 (using as a test for preclusivity whether a successful proxy fight
would be "realistically unattainable"); see also Edelman & Thomas, supra note 135, at
1103 (describing this test as "less onerous" for boards than the Court of Chancery's
test and unclear how it is consistent with the "dissident-friendly" tests of Moran and
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)).
162 See Selectica, 5 A.3d. at 602-03 (citing Professor John C. Coates IV and Peter C.
Harkins for the proposition that proxy contests in micro-cap companies have been
successful even when the challenger began with a percentage ownership less than
5.49%). However, Trilogy's expert witness testified that there was only a single
example of a successful proxy contest waged by a challenger owning less than 5%, and
in that case the firm did not have a staggered board. See Appellants' Reply Brief and
Cross Appellees' Answering Brief at *22-*23, Selectica, 5 A.3d 586 (No. 4241-VCN),
2010 WL 2603844.
163 See Selectica, 5 A.3d. at 605.
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holding may be cabined to its unique factS, 16 4 or this opinion from the
Delaware Supreme Court may bind the Chancery Court with any lowtrigger poison pill in front of it. If the high court holds that a 5%
threshold is not preclusive and does not forestall reasonable chances
of success in a proxy contest, then it seems that a 5% trigger for any
poison pill, NOL poison pill or not, should be upheld, at least in a
nanocap or microcap corporation. Airgas seems to represent the
lowest threshold for the "threat" prong of the Unocal test, and Selectica
seems to represent the lowest threshold for the "preclusive" prong. A
lingering question is whether the two prongs have to relate to one
another in a proportionate way: if the threat in Selectica had been as
minimal as in Airgas, would the court then find the "nonpreclusive"
4.99% trigger within the range of reasonableness?
2.

Is NOL Impairment a Reasonable Threat?

The first prong of the Unocal test is whether the board reasonably
identified a threat to the corporation or the shareholders. 165 The
Delaware Supreme Court seemed to accept that the potential loss of
Selectica's $165 million NOLs was a threat or at least that the board
166
was reasonable in its determination that the NOLs were important.
Implicit in that finding is both that the Board was reasonable in
determining that (1) the NOLs were worth $165 million to Selectica
67
and (2) any bidder crossing a 5% threshold would impair the NOLs.
Whether the NOLs were worth $165 million to Selectica seems
questionable. 168 The value of the carryover to the corporation should
164 See id. at 607 ("The fact that the NOL poison pill was reasonable under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, should not be construed as generally
approving the reasonableness of a 4.99% trigger in the Rights Plan of a corporation

with or without NOLs.").
165 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
166 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 600 (supporting the finding of the Court of Chancery
that "the Board was reasonable in concluding that Selectica's NOLs were worth
preserving and that Trilogy's actions presented a serious threat of their impairment").
167 See id. at 606.
168 Selectica did not undertake an investigation of a "formal estimate of the
probability or likelihood of future use of the NOLs or the expected size of the tax
benefit that might arise from such a use .... " See Answering Brief on Appeal and
Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at *33, Selectica, 5 A.3d
586 (No. 4241-VCN), 2010 WL 2464491; see also Peter B. Siegal, Using Appraisal to
Protect Net Operating Loss Carryforwards, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 927, 942 (2012) ("By
placing the responsibility for valuing NOLs in the hands of the very people who have
the strongest systemic incentive to overvalue them, the NOL pill renders § 382 nearly
useless.").
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represent the present value of the amount of the carryover that will be
usable in any future taxable years before they expire. 169 If Selectica
does not have sufficient income to offset expenses it incurs in future
years, then Selectica will never use any of those NOL carryovers. 170 If
not, then the present value of the NOL carryovers is zero. 171 Trilogy
could have reasoned that without an acquisition, and an influx of
capital, Selectica would not have ever made use of its $165 million
NOLs, making them wholly or partially worthless. 172 Companies are
required to account for this probable value in their financial
statements and mark down the value of this tax asset only if it is more
173
likely than not that the NOLs will be fully used.

169See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own
Companiesfrom Tax?: The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward9 (Harvard Law & Econ.,
Discussion Paper No. 690, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1873429 (noting that under GAAP, NOLs are not discounted to present value for
accounting purposes); Simmons, supra note 83, at 1058-59.
170 At the time Selectica implemented its poison pill in 2009, it had not recorded a
net profit since 2000, the time of its initial public offering. See Appellants Versata
Enters., Inc.'s and Trilogy Inc.'s Opening Brief at *5-*6, Selectica, 5 A.3d 586 (No.
4241-VCN), 2010 WL 2218070.
171 The Delaware Supreme Court opinion's retelling of the facts mentions a
possibility that Selectica might have retained its NOLs by merging its "shell" with a
"profitable operating company." See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 591. Under section 382, this
type of merger would almost certainly result in a 382 limitation. Later, the facts
mention that Selectica was contemplating a "merger of equals." See id. at 592. In order
for that merger not to be an "ownership change," Selectica would have had to merge
with a corporation of approximately the same value, with its current shareholders not
increasing their percentage ownership in the new loss corporation substantially above
their current ownership. The facts also mention the possibility of a going-private
transaction, which most likely would also trigger section 382 unless an existing group
that already owned over 50% would be the eventual owners of 100% of the private
company. See id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2 (2016).
172 Under financial accounting rules, NOLs are recorded as a deferred tax asset, but
are valued as the gross amount of NOLs multiplied by the firm's tax rate. The NOLs
may be recorded as a lower value if the firm believes the value to be impaired under
FASB ASC 740. See Sarah J. Webber & Karie Davis-Nozemack, NOL Poison Pills: Using
Corporate Law for Tax Purposes, 117J. TAX'N. 312, 313 (2012) ("A long track record of
losses or very large losses could be evidence of impaired usage."). Additionally, the
value of the deferred tax asset is not discounted for the time value of money and firms
do not have to consider the NOLs impaired if future profitability of the company is
more likely than not. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 169, at 2-3.
173 See Selectica, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (July 9, 2013) ("Based upon the
weight of available evidence, which includes our historical operating performance and
the reported cumulative net losses in all prior years, we have provided a full valuation
allowance against our net deferred tax assets. We will continue to evaluate the
realizability of the deferred tax assets on a quarterly basis.").
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At some point in time, a company may determine that an influx of
capital or outright sale is worth the loss of the NOL carryovers, which
may or may not be used. 174 Prior to Trilogy beginning its additional
purchases, Selectica was anticipating a potential sale, even one that
would cause a section 382 ownership change and it had not
permanently replaced its CEO because of that very real potential. 175 In
fact, an acquisition might make the NOLs have a nonzero value, with
the acquirer being able to use at least a small percentage of the NOLs
each year against the acquirer's profits instead of none of them. 176 The
existence of section 382 does not make the economics of an
acquisition untenable; whether or not NOLs may be used in whole or
in part after an acquisition is just one variable in making an
acquisition decision. 177 Companies voluntarily choose to impair NOLs
in a variety of ways, presumably because without a change in the
course of action, the NOLs are not worth very much. 178 In fact, the
majority of firms contemplating an initial public offering make this
decision.

179

174 See Simmons, supra note 83, at 1084 ("A loss corporation contemplating a
disposition of assets that would entail a transfer of loss carryovers must determine
whether the consideration offered for the whole package exceeds the present value of
continuing the loss enterprise.").

175 See Answering Brief on Appeal and Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at *10-*11, Selectica, 5 A.3d 586 (No. 4241-VCN), 2010
WL 2464491 ("One category [of likely bidders] consisted of large software companies,
who might view Selectica's products as strategically complementary to their own, and
might be prepared to acquire the whole Company at a premium and to accept a
Section 382 change of ownership (with the result that the buyer could use Selectica's
NOLs only in small increments over many years).").
176 Selectica currently was not using any of its NOL carryovers, but an acquirer
could have used approximately $23 million multiplied by 5.49% (the long-term tax
exempt rate for January 2009), or $1.26 million each year. See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 590.
177 See Capshaw v. Schieck, 44 P.3d 47, 49 (Wyo. 2002) (supporting
indemnification claim of buyers of company which, when attempting to use prechange
losses with a 382 limitation, discovered that total amount of prechange losses was
lower than expected following an IRS audit).
178 See WithumSmith+Brown, Tax Aspects of the Facebook IPO (Alternate Title: Mark
Zuckerberg Could Buy Most of Europe with His 2012 Tax Bill), DOuBLE TAX'N (Feb. 4, 2012),
http//double-taxation.com/2012/02/04/tax-aspects-of-the-facebook-ipo-alternate-title(hypothesizing that
mark-zuckerberg-could-buy-most-of-europe-with-is-2012-tax-bill/
Facebook's Form S-1 showed deferred tax assets (NOLs) because of a possible 382
ownership change during financing rounds prior to making a profit and that if not, any 382
ownership limitation caused by the IPO would be negligible given Facebook's large
capitalization number multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate).
179 See Eric James Allen, The Information Content of the Deferred Tax Valuation
Allowance: Evidence from Venture Capital Backed IPO Firms (Sept. 30, 2012)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), http://papers.
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Though hindsight is not a good test of whether a prior
determination that NOLs were potentially usable was reasonable,
Selectica seems to have had trouble after 2010 using its NOL
carryovers. As of March 31, 2013, Selectica reported having $186.6
million in federal deferred tax assets, and $93 million in state deferred
tax assets. 180 However, Selectica issued various equity securities and
convertible securities in May 2013.181 As of June 30, 2013, Selectica
reported that its tax deferred assets were $2.1 million, presumably
because of the triggering of section 382 limitations.18 2 None of this is
to say that a company should not be able to choose when it will
receive capital in exchange for issuing equity that will impair its NOL
carryovers. However, the fact that Selectica chose to accept $9 million
knowing that it would result in it losing the ability to fully utilize
almost $185 million in carryovers suggests that Selectica valued those
carryovers internally at something close to zero.
Second, the court quickly dispensed with analyzing whether the
board correctly determined that Trilogy threatened to trigger the
section 382 limitation by becoming more than a 5% shareholder. 183
Because of recent share transfers, Selectica as a taxpayer needed to be
concerned with any further acquisitions of stock by 5% shareholders.
However, in other companies, particularly companies with a larger
and more dispersed float, this assumption will not hold.
III.
A.

NOL POISON PILLS IN PRACTICE
Possible NOL Poison Pill Uses

Poison pills are a tactic designed to ward off hostile acquisitional
shareholders, 184 but section 382 was designed to dis-incentivize
friendly acquisitional shareholders from acting in concert with the
ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=2161340 (finding that 82% of IPO firms reduce
the value of their deferred tax assets to zero because of the 382 limitation).
180 See Selectica, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June 17, 2013).
181 See Selectica, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (June 5,
2013) (reflecting a total offering amount of $10,575,745, out of which $9,410,322 had
been sold).
182 See Selectica, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (August 14, 2013).
183 Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 600 (Del. 2010).
184 See Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037,
1037 (2002) ("September of this year will mark the twentieth anniversary of the
publication of my memorandum recommending that companies adopt the poison pill,
which I invented in the summer of 1982 to deal with the takeover abuses that emerged
in the 1970s and had become endemic by the end of the decade.").
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target board for purely tax reasons. However, the Selectica board
makes the argument that the perhaps unintended consequence of
section 382 is to make corporations potential victims not of friendly
acquisitional shareholders, but also of hostile acquisitional
shareholders (Hostile Acquirers), volatile shareholders (Accidental
Bunglers), sabotaging competitor shareholders (Bad Faith Saboteurs),
or a combination. 185 In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that a
shareholder rights plan could be used in contexts other than a hostile
takeover, though the court maintained that the Unocal test would still
apply to the plan. 186 If the NOL poison pill has a legitimate use, that of
a proportionate response to a legitimate threat to corporate
effectiveness, then that defensive tactic must theoretically prevent at
least one of these three groups from partially or wholly impairing the
NOL tax asset. However, an NOL poison pill with a 4.99% trigger does
not discourage or impede any of these three shareholders from
impairing the NOLs. This Article argues that the NOL poison pill is
adopted to thwart a very different type of shareholder, the Activist
Shareholder, not from impairing a tax asset, but from gaining enough
ownership to pressure the board.
1. Hostile Acquirers
Any acquirer valuing a potential target understands that section 382
limits the ability of the acquirer to use NOLs following the
acquisition. 187 If the shareholder wants to acquire the target, then it
must have already factored in the loss of the NOLs in its postacquisition valuation of the target; therefore, an acquirer would in
most circumstances value the NOLs at zero if contemplating an
acquisition. 188 True Hostile Acquirers will not want the accumulated
185 If the shareholders of Selectica had not inadvertently approached triggering the
318 limitation, then Trilogy's purchases would not have been enough to trigger the
318 limitation alone. See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 599.
186 See id. ("Any NOL poison pill's principal intent, however, is to prevent the
inadvertent forfeiture of potentially valuable assets, not to protect against hostile
takeover attempts. Even so, any Shareholder Rights Plan, by its nature, operates as an
antitakeover device. Consequently, notwithstanding its primary purpose, a NOL
poison pill must also be analyzed under Unocal because of its effect and its direct
implications for hostile takeovers."); see also Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
187 See Simmons, supra note 83, at 1084 (noting that because of section 382, "[tlhe
purchaser is indifferent to the acquisition of net operating loss carryovers because it
must pay the current present value of the future tax savings (less an appropriate risk
factor)").
188 See Thomas W. Bottomlee, Jason S. Bazar & Arthur C. Walker, Don't Ignore a
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NOLs of a target issuer to be severely limited or to disappear - that
would make an acquisition less attractive, particularly if the NOLs are
a substantial asset of the corporation. 89 In other words, if the NOLs
are worth anything substantial, a bidder will not engage in a hostile
takeover. However, if the NOLs are not worth much because they are
large with respect to the value of the corporation or because the target
will likely never use them, then a Hostile Acquirer will not care
whether section 382 is triggered or not. Therefore, an NOL poison pill
will never have any use against a true Hostile Acquirer. In addition,
though most poison pills work by dilution of the acquirer's shares,
dilution when a shareholder holds only 5% is not as economically
damaging as dilution at a threshold of 15-20%, particularly when the
target has a small capitalization. 190 Then, the pill must be reset to stop
any further increases of share ownership.
2.

Accidental Bunglers

As the Selectica board found, companies with concentrated
ownership and small public floats may be at risk of triggering section
382 due to otherwise innocuous trading.' 9 ' Accidental Bunglers may
be a threat to this tax asset not because of a bad faith purpose, but
because these shareholders may trigger the section 382 limitations by

Target's NOLs: The Price and Structure of Your Deal Can Depend on Them, 9 M&A J.,
June 2009, at 19. The parties could conceivably structure a section 368 reorganization
such that the section 382 limitation would not be triggered, but the options for that
structure are fairly narrow. For example, the parties could structure the acquisition as
a taxable asset sale, with the selling corporation retaining the NOLs and using them to
offset the taxable gain. The acquiring corporation would then own the assets with a
stepped-up basis, increasing the value of the acquisition.
189 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 599 n.15 (quoting the Court of Chancery that "typically,
companies with large NOLs would not be at risk of takeover attempts if the NOLs are
the company's principal asset, as the takeover would likely trigger a change in control
and impair the asset").
190 Selectica's poison pill, when triggered, reduced Trilogy's interest from 6.7% to
3.3%. See id. at 590. According to the court, the market capitalization was roughly $23
million, making Trilogy's beginning interest worth about $1.5 million. See id. In 2011,
Selectica eventually settled with Trilogy and repaid $4.5 million to its creditor,
repurchased its stock, and paid Trilogy $1 million in consulting fees. See Selectica,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 10.1) (Sept. 21, 2011) (Comprehensive
Settlement Agreement referencing a settlement payment of $4,461,574 and another
payment of $472,047.56 for Versata's stock, as well as two payments of $500,000 each
under a separate Services Agreement).
191 See Selectica, 5 A.3d at 594 (concluding that because of heavy trading by
minority shareholders in its small public float, Selectica was close to an accidental
"ownership change").
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accident. Though the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the
"principal intent" of an NOL poison pill "is to prevent the inadvertent
forfeiture of potentially valuable assets," 192 such a tactic will not and
cannot prevent Accidental Bunglers. An NOL poison pill, like any type
of poison pill, has no physical effect on trading. The pill cannot
prevent or void trading.1 93 Accidental Bunglers will accidentally trigger
the poison pill just as they would accidentally trigger section 382.
Notice of such a poison pill would probably only deter them to the
same extent as would a notice explaining the threshold rules, a far less
drastic proposition.
3.

Bad Faith Saboteurs

Selectica is an interesting case because the bidder was not just a
Hostile Acquirer. Trilogy was a competitor of Selectica, had secured
enforceable judgments against Selectica for patent infringement, and
was a competitor with Selectica in "the relatively narrow market space
of contract management and sales configuration."' 194 Because of
Trilogy's unique stance as a shareholder, normal motivations that
would prevent the Hostile Acquirer from triggering the poison pill or
jeopardizing the utilization of NOLs were not present. In the worst
light, Trilogy could best be described as a Bad Faith Saboteur. Trilogy
may have had an end goal of (1) acquiring Selectica in a friendly
merger; (2) convincing management to sell particular assets to Trilogy;
(3) forcing Selectica into bankruptcy, where Trilogy may be a senior
secured creditor and able to purchase Selectica with its preexisting
debt; 195 or (4) gaining leverage designed to force management to repay
its debt. Even if Trilogy was aiming for the first option, the friendly
merger, it may still not value the NOLs close to $165 million. But, if
Trilogy was more interested in any of the other three options,
triggering a section 382 limitation may actually advance that goal. One
could imagine a scenario in which a shareholder may want to trigger
section 382 to drive a competitor or a debtor into bankruptcy.
Id. at 599.
See Van Deusen, supra note 125, at 18-19 ("A section 382 poison pill merely
discourages shareholders from engaging in transactions that could cause percentage
point increases. A section 382 poison pill would not prevent or void a transaction that
produces a percentage point increase.").
194 Selectica, 5 A.3d at 590.
195 See Michelle M. Hamer, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at
the Gate?, 89 WAsH. U. L. REV. 155, 169 (2011) ("[TIhe objective of debtholders in a
loan-to-own scenario is ownership of the company either through a credit bid in an
asset sale or a debt-to-equity exchange.").
192
193
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The Bad Faith Saboteur seems like an appropriate focus for a board
of director's arsenal of weapons. However, if the saboteur wants to
harm the company by triggering the NOLs intentionally, then the
NOL poison pill does not do much to the saboteur. In fact, the actual
operation of the poison pill, issuing additional shares to existing
shareholders in a non-pro rata fashion (the Bad Faith Saboteur does
not get the opportunity to purchase more shares), may even push a
company closer to an ownership change. Just as was displayed in
Selectica, a Bad Faith Saboteur may believe the cost of dilution to be
196
worth the benefit of causing a competitor to lose a valuable asset.
Target boards may argue that a low-trigger poison pill allows the
board to keep track of 5% shareholders and to be warned when a new
shareholder crosses that threshold. However, for a publicly-held
corporation, Rule 13d-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires 5% shareholders to file either a Schedule 13D or Schedule
97
13G, thus alleviating that concern.
B.

Strategic Uses of the NOL Poison Pill

The danger after Selectica, however, is that the NOL poison pill will
be used not against Mesa Petroleum-like shareholders or even Trilogylike shareholders, but against the much more common activist
shareholder. 198 These shareholders do not wish to take control of a
corporation, 99 but rather work from a substantial minority stake to
pressure boards to pursue avenues that maximize shareholder
wealth. 20 0 In a large publicly-held corporation, boards of directors face

196 One could argue that Selectica's competitor, Trilogy, had every incentive to
trigger a "change of ownership" of the struggling firm because even though it cost
Trilogy a small sum, the loss may have been worth much more to Selectica. See
Answering Brief on Appeal and Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal of Appellee/CrossAppellant at *4,Selectica, 5 A.3d 586 (No. 4241-VCN), 2010 WL 2464491("The
extensive record reflects that Trilogy took the unprecedented step of deliberately
triggering a poison pill - exposing its equity investment of under $2 million to
dilution - primarily in an effort to extract substantially more value for the other two
'legs' of the 'stool' [that is, Trilogy's relationship as creditor and competitor].").
197 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2016).
198 See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 135, at 1128-29 (describing the use of
poison pills against "hedge funds that have acted as shareholder-activist investors on
issues related to governance and strategy").
199See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present and Future of
ShareholderActivism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CoRP. L. 51, 58-60 (2011) (distinguishing
between the "market for control" with traditional bidders and the "market for
influence" with activist shareholders).
200 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
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very little threat from hostile takeovers, which require large amounts
of cash or debt and which are easily staved off by ordinary poison pills
and other tactics. 20 1 However, boards may find their work made more
difficult by noisy activist shareholders who threaten proxy fights
unless their agendas and plans are considered. The greater the stake an
activist shareholder has, the larger the megaphone. 202 Obviously,
activist shareholders can create value or destroy it, 203 depending on
the particular agendas and personalities involved. Recently, the
Delaware courts upheld poison pills specifically designed to thwart
activist shareholders, not tender offer bidders. 204 By allowing target
companies to set ownership levels differently depending on the
identity or motivations of the shareholder, the Delaware courts have
1383 (2007) (distinguishing between private equity funds, which "actively reshape[]
business plans, but [do] so behind closed doors over periods of years" with hedge
funds, which "tell managers how to realize the value and to challenge publicly those
who resist their advice").
201 In 2012, Netflix adopted a poison pill with a 10% trigger to thwart the overtures
of Carl Icahn, who had acquired a 9.98% stake. The Netflix plan was similar to
Sotheby's plan in Ruprecht in that shareholders who file a Schedule 13G with the SEC
instead of a Schedule 13D can acquire up to 20% of Netflix stock without triggering
the poison pill. See Netflix Adopts Poison Pill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012, 1:28 PM),
Schedule
http://dealbook.nytimes.com2012/11/05/netflix-adopts-poison-pill? _r=0.
13D and 13G are mandatory reporting devices for shareholders acquiring 5% or more
of a publicly-held corporation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2016). After crossing that
threshold, a shareholder has 10 days to file Schedule 13D; however, a shareholder
could file Schedule 13G instead if, among other things, the shareholder "acquired
such securities in the ordinary course of his business and not with the purpose nor
with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer." Id. Therefore, the
Netflix and Sotheby's poison pills have different triggers for active investors and
passive investors.
202 See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:
An Empirical Analysis, J. CORP. L. 681, 697 (2007) (reporting empirical findings that
out of fifty-two activist efforts on public companies by hedge funds, twenty-six funds
had stakes of at least 9.5%). Notable for the purposes of this Article, only five of the
hedge fund activists launching campaigns had less than a 4.9% stake. See id.
203 See Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence:
Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 813, 827 (2015)
(describing activist hedge funds as "information traders" who invest resources to
gather and analyze information about a firm, and continually provide information to
the market about managerial inefficiencies and that firm).
204 See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1, *10
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (upholding Sotheby's shareholder rights plan, which created a
10% trigger for shareholders who file a Schedule 13D with the SEC, versus a 20%
trigger for shareholders who file a Schedule 13G); Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v.
Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 313 (Del. Ch. 2010) (upholding a shareholder rights plan that
limited Yucaipa to an ownership stake of 20%, but allowing its CEO to have a 30%
stake).
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blessed "two-tier" defense tactics even though "two-tier" bids have
20
been relegated to history. 5
The Selectica decision further empowers boards targeted by activist
shareholders by allowing boards to defend themselves from noisy
shareholders by setting very low triggers. 206 Though the Unocal
analysis is supposed to work to flesh out management's pretextual
arguments against a hostile bidder, the analysis works in the NOL
poison pill to give credibility to the pretextual concern over tax assets.
Instead, articulating a need to protect NOLs may give cover to
entrenched management to protect itself.207 Following the Sotheby's

decision, which allowed a large corporation to set an anti-activist pill
trigger at 10%, a similarly situated firm with NOLs could articulate a
facially valid tax reason to set a pill with a trigger half as large. By
setting a poison pill with a trigger of 4.99%, companies can limit the
influence of noisy activist shareholders 208 and can ensure that required
205 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) ("Here,
the threat posed was viewed by the Unocal board as a grossly inadequate two-tier
coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail."). Mesa's suspect bid
separated the selling shareholders into two groups: early sellers and later sellers.
Shareholder rights plans legally separate shareholders into two groups: non-acquiring
shareholders and acquiring shareholders.
206 See Siegal, supra note 168, at 942 ("By limiting the ownership share and
attendant voting power that a potential acquirer can obtain before challenging an
incumbent board, the NOL pill seriously threatens the interests of activist
shareholders.").
207 See Thomas J. Boulton & Terry D. Nixon, Tax Benefit Preservation Plans 3
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2438003 (finding support
for an entrenchment hypothesis by examining 118 firms that adopted tax benefit
preservation plans between 1998 and 2011 and finding abnormal returns associated
with the announcement of those plans). In addition, the authors found that abnormal
returns for firms with NOLs were associated with the timing of the Selectica Delaware
Supreme Court decision, but no abnormal returns for firms without NOLs during that
same time period. See id. at 21; see also Stephanie A. Sikes, Xiaoli Tian & Ryan
Wilson, Investors' Reaction to the Use of Poison Pills as a Tax Loss PreservationTool, 57
J. ACCT. & ECON. 132, 141 (2014) (finding "significant negative market reaction to the
announcement of NOL poison pill adoptions, suggesting that investors believe the
potential agency costs resulting from the poison pill adoptions will exceed any
potential tax benefits").
208 For example, Carl lcahn's investment firms purchased 8.9% of the outstanding
stock of Dell, Inc., complicating and delaying the eventual management-led buyout of
that firm. See Miles Weiss, Carl Icahn Withdraws His Appraisal Request for Dell Stake,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201310-04/icahn-says-he-withdrew-request-for-appraisal-on-dell;
see
also
Connie
Guglielmo, You Won't Have Michael Dell to Kick Around Anymore, FORBES, Nov. 18,
2013. Icahn also reportedly purchased a 10% stake in Netflix in 2012, prompting
changes in business strategy. See Steven Bertoni & Nathan Vardi, Armed & Dangerous,
FoRBEs, Apr. 15, 2013 (describing how firms adopt poison pills in response to
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shareholder votes for acquisitions and other major corporate changes
are easier for boards to manage because investors with smaller
holdings are less likely to withhold proxies or launch proxy fights.
Finally, a universal 4.99% cap on investor ownership would also
have a devastating effect on new or proposed pro-shareholder
corporate governance reforms. Recent SEC proposals to allow some
forms of shareholder proxy access have conditioned shareholder rights
on significant shareholder stakes. 20 9 If large shareholder stakes become
impossible for many companies, then these reforms will become
meaningless. 210
C. Section 382 Ownership Limit in Articles of Incorporation
A firm that believes it is in danger from either the Accidental
Bungler, Hostile Acquirer, or Bad Faith Saboteur has an alternative,
more effective defensive device. A charter provision preventing
shareholders from becoming 5% shareholders or trading at levels
otherwise threatening an ownership change can guard against
impairment of NOLs, but at the same time not work to entrench
management. 21 Under such a charter provision, approved by the
shareholders, transfers violating the provision could be voided by the
board of directors. This strategy has been blessed by the I.R.S., which
takes the position that if the board voids the transfer, an ownership
change did not occur and any temporary increase will not be included
in a future ownership change calculation. 212 In most cases, only boards
investments by Carl Icahn).
209 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
mandated that the SEC adopt a proxy access rule. See J.W. Verret, Defending Against
Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware's Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of
Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 393 (2011). This rule, Rule 14a-11, required
shareholders to have a minimum ownership of 3% before gaining access to the firm's
proxy materials. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir.
2011). However, this controversial rule was invalidated by judicial action and a
successor rule was not proposed. See id. at 1156.
210 The SEC responded to the Business Roundtable decision by amending Rule 14a-8
to allow shareholders to propose proxy access for a specific firm in a shareholder
proposal; according to one researcher's findings, the majority of proxy access
proposals retained the 3% ownership requirement of vacated Rule 14a-11. See Shifeng
Ni, Proxy Access Revisited. Regulatory Function of the Rule 14a-11 Formula, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (Oct. 30, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/20 15/10/30/proxyaccess-revisited-regulatory-function-of-the-rule- 14a-1 1-formula/.
211 See Van Deusen, supra note 125, at 19 ("A section 382 ownership limit likely
would provide the most protection from an ownership change.").
212 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000837027, 2008 WL 4185359 (Sept. 12, 2008)
("For purposes of determining whether a 'testing date' or an 'ownership change' has
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who could truly articulate the need for what amounts to restricted
shares would be able to convince shareholders to agree to amend the
articles of incorporation. Large, publicly-held corporations would not
be able to convince investors to own similarly restricted shares or
might suffer a share discount if such restrictions were in the IPO
charter. Theoretically, such a charter provision could not be used
strategically by a board against specific activist shareholders.
IV.

WHO IS USING THE NOL POISON PILL?

NOL poison pills may be used either defensively, against Hostile
Acquirers, Accidental Bunglers or Bad Faith Saboteurs, or strategically,
against the specter of activist shareholders. To 'determine which is
happening in the market, the author has looked at the universe of
publicly-held companies that have adopted NOL poison pills between
January 1998 and February 2014, which amounts to 155 unique
firms. 2 13 Over eighty percent of the firms in the dataset adopted the
NOL poison pills after January 2008, and in 2009, forty-four firms

adopted poison pills, four times as many as in 2008,214 suggesting that
the worsening economy during the financial crisis of 2008215 may have
spurred interest in protecting growing NOL carryovers. 216 Another
trend the data suggests relates to the industries of the adopting firms.
Of the 155 firms in the dataset, forty-five (29%) finns are in the
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Industries (SIC Code 6000-6999).
occurred for Controlled within the meaning of Section 382 and the underlying
Treasury Regulations at any time on or after the Split-Off, and provided that the
Transfer Restrictions are enforceable under State C law (as described in representation
(W) and enforced according to their terms, any purported acquirer of Controlled Stock
in contravention of the Transfer Restrictions will not be considered as acquiring
ownership of such Controlled Stock."). Depending on the state of incorporation, an
amendment implementing restrictions on stock may be valid only on shares issued
after the amendment and on shares that voted in favor of the amendment. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-649 (2015) ("A restriction does not affect shares issued before the
restriction was adopted unless the holders of the shares are parties to the restriction
agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.").
213 See infra APPENDIX A.
214 See infraAPPENDIX B.
215 See generally Robert Rich, The Great Recession of 2007-09, FED. RES. BANK (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/58 (detailing the
"Great Recession," which began in December 2007 and lasted until June 2009).
216 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC

CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 394 (2011) (reporting that in 2009, 61,000 business firms
filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S., compared with less than 20,000 firms in
2006).
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This classification includes national banks, state banks, insurance
companies, and securities brokers. 217 The outsized representation of
this industry seems reflective of the global financial crisis that had a
the
substantial impact on those associated businesses. 218 Relatedly,
219
Builders).
(Operative
1531
is
code
SIC
next most numerous
In addition to the plunging economy, another factor that may have
led to increased adoptions in 2009, 2010, and 2011220 was the Selectica
case, which went to trial in the spring of 2009. The NOL poison pill in
that case was upheld by the Delaware Court of Chancery in early
2010.221 Firms may have been watching that case to decide whether to
222
adopt an NOL poison pill.
If either the Defensive Acquisition Hypothesis or Defensive Saboteur
Hypothesis is correct, then firms adopting NOL poison pills out of
necessity should have small capitalizations, concentrated ownership,
perhaps be at some risk of a hostile takeover because of industry or
otherwise, and have a significant amount of NOL carryovers compared
to fair market value of their outstanding shares. These firms are most
at risk of a section 382 "ownership change," and would have a smaller
limitation on post-change use of the NOLs using the calculation of
market capitalization multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate.
However, if the Strategic Board Hypothesis is correct, then firms
adopting NOL poison pills will have large market capitalizations, will
have smaller amounts of NOL carryovers compared to fair market
217 See infra APPENDIX A (showing eighteen Depository Institutions (SIC 60006099); five Nondepository Institutions (SIC 6100-6199); one Securities &
Commodities Broker Dealers (SIC 6200-6299); eleven Insurance Carriers (SIC 63006399); four Real Estate firms (SIC 6500-6599); and six Holding & Investment
Operatives (SIC 6700-6799)). Many of these companies may have participated in the
TARP program, which may have resulted in the U.S. government taking equity
positions in them. However, neither the investment nor the redemption of that
investment triggered section 382 by virtue of I.R.S. Notices. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
218 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 216, at 400-01 (reporting that

between January 2009 and the end of December 2010, 297 banks failed in the U.S.).
219 See infra APPENDIX A; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 216, at 391
(reporting that unemployment in the construction industry averaged 19.1% in 2009
and 20.6% for the first eleven months of 2010).
220 See infra APPENDIX B (showing forty-four adoptions in 2009 and twenty-two
adoptions each in 2010 and 2011, up from a previous all-time high of eleven in 2008).
221 Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062, at *25 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 26, 2010), affd, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
222 In addition, there may be a law firm factor at work; certain law firms may have
started advising their clients about NOL poison pills beginning in 2009. However, at
this time the dataset does not speak to whether there is such a pattern.
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value of outstanding shares, will have less concentrated public
ownership, and will have more risk of being the target of an activist
hedge fund or other agitating investor than a hostile takeover. If,
however, the firms who have adopted NOL poison pills appear to be a
random slice of publicly-held companies, then none of these theories
may be behind the trend. The data seem to give support to both the
Defensive Acquisition/Defensive Saboteur Hypotheses and the
223
Strategic Board Hypothesis.
A.

The Microcap Companies

Of the 155 firms in the dataset, 110, or just over seventy percent, are
microcap firms and have market capitalizations of under $300 million,
and sixty-six of those firms are nanocap companies, with market
capitalizations of under $50. For many of these firms, protecting the
NOL assets could be the primary impetus behind the low-trigger

poison pill. 224 As the Selectica court noted, the NOL poison pill may be

the most useful to preserve tax assets when a company has a very
small capitalization. The Selectica court noted that the firm had a
capitalization of $23 million, 225 but only thirty-three firms in the
dataset out of 144 are as small as Selectica or smaller.
For many of these microcap and nanocap firms, particularly if such
firms had large NOL carryovers, a Delaware court would almost
certainly uphold an NOL poison pill after Selectica.226 Whether or not
the NOL poison pill would actually meet its goal in any of these cases,
however, is an open question. The poison pill has no physical effect on
223 See infra APPENDIX C. The data indicates that NOL poison pills have mainly been
adopted by companies with either very small or very large market capitalizations, and
less commonly by mid-sized companies. Id. Microcap companies have concerns both

about volatility leading to an ownership change and being a takeover target; these
concerns are not as salient for very large firms. Mid-sized firms would have more
reason to adopt these plans for those reasons than large firms.
224 But see Oakhurst Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 29, 1998) (stating as
the reason for the rights plan not any tax assets but "the problem of a raider using
what the Board of Directors perceives to be coercive tactics to deprive the Company's
Board of Directors and stockholders of any real opportunity to determine the destiny
of the Company by forcing the raider to negotiate with the Company's Board of
Directors").
225 Selectica, 2010 VIL 703062, at *2. Selectica, Inc. adopted its NOL poison pill on
November 17, 2008. Id. at *7. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009, Selectica
reported that the aggregate value of its common stock not held by affiliates was a little
over $29 million. See Selectica, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (July 9, 2009); infra
APPENDIX A (showing Selectica's valuation).
226 See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 600-01 (Del. 2010) (finding
that the threat of losing a large tax asset satisfied the first prong of the Unocal test).
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the purchaser of shares; if the purchaser is unaware or unconcerned,
the pill will not be able to block the purchaser's trading and will result
in the shareholders participating in the rights plan increasing their
percentages. In the case of the Bad Faith Saboteur, the NOL poison pill
may slow the purchaser down, but might not be able to prevent an
ownership change given the operation of the poison pill and a
committed Bad Faith Saboteur. Likewise, if a Hostile Acquirer has
already valued the NOL tax assets as zero following an acquisition,
then the deterrence value of the NOL poison pill is merely dilution, at
a very low ownership level.
B.

The Billion-DollarCompanies

Though the fact that seventy percent of firms adopting NOL poison
pills are microcap companies should not be surprising and supports
the typical arguments for adopting a tax benefit preservation plan, the
existence of very large firms in the dataset is counterintuitive. In fact,
very large firms are the second biggest adopters of the NOL poison
pill. 227 The presence of twenty-seven firms with market capitalizations
of over $1 billion 228 (and four more whose market capitalizations
hover close to that mark) 229 in the dataset, 17.42% of firms who

adopted NOL poison pills during the time period, strongly supports
the Strategic Board Hypothesis. In 2009, eleven out of forty-four firms
that adopted NOL poison pills were billion-dollar companies. 23° The
three largest firms in the dataset are American International Group
(AIG), Ford Motor, and Citigroup, with market capitalizations of
227

See infra APPENDIX C.

228 For comparison, the SEC uses a $700 million market capitalization (held by

non-affiliates) as the dividing line between "Well-Known Seasoned Issuer" (WKSI)
and "Seasoned Issuer." See 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (2016). The dataset contains thirty-one
WKSIs (20%). See infra APPENDIX A.
229 These firms are J.C. Penney Company, Inc.; Ally Financial; ARIAD
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; CapitalSource Inc.; US Airways Group, Inc.; KB Home; AOL
Inc.; The Howard Hughes Corporation; Eastman Kodak Company; Level 3
Communications, Inc.; American International Group, Inc.; Tenet Healthcare
Corporation; GenOn Energy, Inc.; Dendreon Corporation; Synovus Financial Corp.;
Ford Motor Company; D.R. Horton, Inc.; CIT Group Inc.; Toll Brothers, Inc.;
Citigroup Inc.; Sirius XM Holdings Inc.; Mirant Corporation; PulteGroup, Inc.;
Centex Corporation; tw telecom inc.; Lear Corporation; The Ryland Group, Inc.,
Reinsurance Group of America, Inc.; Charter Communications, Inc.; and USG
Corporation.
230 See infra APPENDIX A (listing tw telecom inc.; KB Home; Centex Corporation;
Citigroup Inc.; PulteGroup, Inc.; Mirant Corporation; Sirius XM Holdings Inc.; Toll
Brothers, Inc.; CIT Group Inc.; D.R. Horton, Inc.; and Ford Motor Company as
adopting NOL poison pills in 2009).
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approximately over $10 billion as of the date of adoption. These firms
do not seem at risk for either an unintentional "ownership change"
under section 382 or a completed hostile takeover, given the
availability of other tried and true defensive tactics. Hostile bids still
occur, but generally result either in the board rebuffing the offeror, the
231
offeror raising the price, or the board finding a different acquirer.
Though shareholder proxy advisor services have pressured firms to
de-stagger boards 232 and forego other draconian defensive tactics, case
law is on the side of the board of directors that wants to reject an
unsolicited bid and adopt a garden-variety poison pill. 233 However,
these firms may be particularly attractive to activist shareholders. 234 In
fact, activist shareholders may join with unsolicited bidders in
increasing pressure on boards to seek value for shareholders. 235
V.

REFORMING SECTION

382?

Though Selectica paints a picture of a corporation trembling in fear
that its NOLs will be destroyed by either Accidental Bunglers or Bad
Faith Saboteurs, to date no broad-based clamor for section 382 has
emerged. The financial crisis undoubtedly resulted in large numbers of
firms with large NOLs, but presumably the other modem-day
231

See Jen Wieczner, Why Mylan Just Lost the Largest Hostile Takeover Battle Ever,

FORTUNE (Nov. 13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/mylan-loses-hostile-bidperrigo/ (detailing the failed hostile bid of Mylan for Perrigo, explaining "rarely do
deals happen under hostile conditions: slince 2000, completed takeovers of unwilling
targets have been worth less than $10 billion each"); see also David Gelles, Hostile
Takeover Bids for Big Firms Across Industries Make a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2014, at B1 ("Constraints on hostile deal making remain. Such efforts require a
commitment of resources and the willingness to engage in war of words with a
reluctant target, all without any guarantee of success.")
232 See Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 237, 240-43
(2015) ("Nearly all public companies have abandoned [takeover defenses] under the
advice and pressure of shareholder advocates.").
233 See Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 19, 25 (2015) ("The prospects for the hostile takeover as a solution to
corporate governance problems were effectively squashed by Delaware's case law and
statutory enactments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. .. ").
234 See Tom Braithwaite, US Banks Can't Ignore Shareholder Activism, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://on.ft.com/Ub0xsS (reporting on shareholder activism
at State Street and Citigroup); Ben McLannahan & Stephen Foley, AIG's Chief
Executive Begins Fightback Against Activist Investors, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015, 4:31
PM), http://on.ft.com/lko07TZ (discussing Carl Icahn's pressure on AIG's CEO Peter
Hancock to conduct asset sales).
235 See Gelles, supra note 231 ("In some ways, the threat of activists has replaced
the threat of hostile deal making. Companies now prepare for activist investors as they
once did for hostile bidders.").
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recession from March 2001 to November 2001 also caused NOLs
restricted under the same section 382. If section 382 is having such
significant unintended consequences, such as giving Bad Faith
Saboteurs significant power over competitors or causing firms to
haphazardly lose valuable tax assets, then section 382 should be
reformed. However, this Article does not argue that section 382 is
causing as much turmoil as the recent uptick in NOL poison pills
would indicate, further bolstering the hypothesis that NOL poison
pills are being used against activist shareholders, not any group that
actually threatens NOL carryovers. Companies most at risk of having
an inadvertent adverse section 382 event are publicly-held nanocap
and microcap companies, and perhaps that universe is so sufficiently
small that the problem of an accidental triggering event is isolated and
rare. A survey of case law, requests for administrative guidance, or
even congressional testimony suggest that the involuntary loss of NOL
236
carryovers is not a widespread problem.
That being said, if section 382 is providing cover for boards to act
strategically against activist shareholders, then perhaps amending that
section could take away this weapon. For example, the rule could
provide that shareholders who file a Schedule 13D or otherwise
launch a tender offer will not be considered in the calculation of an
ownership change unless that shareholder becomes a 10%
shareholder. Again, even this reform may not be necessary.
VI.

RESHAPING

NOL POISON

PILL JURISPRUDENCE

If the Delaware courts once again face a shareholder suit in which a
shareholder claims that a board of directors has breached the duty of
loyalty by adopting or maintaining an NOL poison pill with a low
trigger, then hopefully the courts will use the Unocal test to ensure
that the company is using such a pill in good faith. If the Unocal
analysis is supposed to ferret out pretextual arguments by boards for
defending the company against disfavored share purchasers, then

236 For example, a search for 382 & "net operating loss" in Westlaw Congressional
Testimony database in the past three years returned forty-four results, few of them
relevant to this inquiry. When speakers do testify to Congress regarding section 382,
they generally are asking for more generous carrybacks, up-front expensing, or
exemptions for research and development NOLs. See, e.g., Fostering the Competitive
Edge: Examining the Effect of Federal Policies on Competition, Innovation, and Job
Growth: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science, Space & Tech., 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of Ron Cohen, President and CEO, Acorda Therapeutics) (arguing for the
exemption of research and development NOLs from the 382 limitation and for
exemptions from "ownership change" for certain types of venture financing).
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courts should not accept that any corporation with NOLs is justified in
using an NOL poison pill against a 5% shareholder. Under the first
prong of the Unocal test, the court should in fact determine whether
the board is pre-textually claiming a fear that the NOLs will be
impaired. Some factors the court should consider are whether the firm
has a small capitalization, whether the value of the NOLs are large in
comparison with the firm's net income or other financial metric,
whether the firm has attempted to put a transfer limitation in its
charter, and whether the firm is reasonably valuing its NOLs in terms
of being able to use them to offset income before expiration.
Under the second prong of the Unocal test, courts should consider
carefully whether a 4.99% or similar trigger has a preclusive effect on a
proxy fight. Most firms will not be like Selectica, with a small number
of shareholders in addition to a small market capitalization. For
example, a 4.99% shareholder at Citigroup or Ford Motor Corporation
launching a proxy fight would have a much lower probability of
success given the highly dispersed nature of the public shareholders.
The worst outcome would be that the holding in Airgas and the
special facts of Selectica pave the way for corporate boards to survive a
Unocal analysis with a lower threshold for both prongs. That is, any
uninvited tender offer constitutes a sufficient threat, and a very low
threshold trigger restricting share ownership is not preclusive. If so,
then any corporation with a low-trigger poison pill will be aided by
the courts, NOLs or not.
In the closely-held context, another Delaware case, eBay v.
Newmark, 237 seems to hold some insight into the low-trigger poison
pill. 238 In that case, two of the three shareholder-directors of Craigslist
adopted a poison pill and a staggered board to further isolate the third
shareholder, eBay. 239 Because the two individual founder-shareholders
were parties to a shareholder agreement, eBay could not possibly
acquire the company through purchases or a gain control through a
proxy contest. 240 However, combined with a dilutive issuance that
decreased eBay's percentage from 28.4% to 24.9%, the foundershareholders may have hoped to convince eBay to sell its shares to the
company or themselves. The Delaware Chancery Court ordered
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
See Joseph M. Grieco, Note, The Ever-Evolving Poison Pill: The Pill in Asset
Protection and Closely-Held CorporationCases, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 625, 637-38 (2011)
(connecting the two cases, Selectica and eBay, as the two cases in which a poison pill
is analyzed in a non-takeover context).
239 eBay, 16 A.3d at 6.
237
238

24o

Id. at 31.

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 50:137

rescission of the poison pill. 241 Applying the Unocal test, Chancellor
Chandler found that the directors could not have reasonably
concluded that a legitimate threat existed. 242 The founders argued that
even though eBay could not gain control during their lifetimes,
following their deaths, eBay might gain control and destroy the
Craigslist corporate culture. 243 Chancellor Chandler determined that
the board had not sufficiently identified the existence of a
"distinctively predictable craigslist culture" that promoted stockholder
value and had also not proved that the rights plan was adopted to
preserve that corporate culture. 244 Instead, the court found the rights
plan was adopted to punish eBay for (legally) competing with
245
Craigslist.
Similarly, though a tax asset, like corporate culture, may have value,
a board of directors should have to articulate that asset's connection to
stockholder value. At what point will the NOL have value to the
shareholders and how much are good starting points in this inquiry.
In addition, a court should inquire as to whether the board adopted
the NOL poison pill to protect tax assets or to achieve a different goal.
CONCLUSION

Whether one subscribes to the agency theory of shareholder
primacy or the contractarian theory of director primacy, boards of
directors have great discretion in determining whether, when, and
how to sell the corporation. Defensive tactics, like poison pills, can be
tools in wielding that discretion in the service of creating shareholder
value. However, a poison pill either to oppress a minority shareholder,
as in eBay v. Newmark, or to minimize the impact of activist
shareholders, seems to exceed the "maximum dosage" of the pill. The
Id. at 35.
See id. at 31-33 (noting that Unocal could be used in a closely-held or publiclyheld context).
243 See id. at 32 ("Jim and Craig ask this Court to validate their attempt to use a pill
to shape the future of the space-time continuum.").
244 Chancellor Chandler pointed out that the culture Jim and Craig were describing
was actually designed not to enhance shareholder value, i.e., the culture focused on
not monetizing Craigslist. See id. at 34 ("Jim and Craig did prove that they personally
believe Craigslist should not be about the business of stockholder wealth
maximization, now or in the future."). But see David A. Wishnick, Comment,
Corporate Purpose in a Free Enterprise System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121
YALE L. J. 2405, 2412-13 (making the interesting argument that given Delaware's
penchant for private ordering, shareholder maximization should be merely the default
purpose of a for-profit corporation).
245 See eBay, 16 A.3d at 35.
241

242
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NOL poison pill, while facially plausible as a tool to protect tax assets
from impairment, may be a stepping stone to a low-trigger antishareholder pill. 2 46 Instead of warding off uninvited potential
acquirers, the pill could ward off shareholder voice.
If an NOL poison pill was self-enforcing, like a charter amendment
restricting transfers of shares, then it would work against the various
types of shareholders that could impair tax assets. However, the
Accidental Bungler seems hard to deter because she (individually or as
a group) is not paying attention anyway and the Bad Faith Saboteur is
fairly motivated but thankfully rare. The Hostile Acquirer, though
more prevalent, seems unimpaired by the NOL poison pill. Logically,
then, the most effective and probable use of the NOL poison pill is to
thwart activist shareholders, with the existence of the deferred tax
asset providing pre-textual cover for the board. As the saying goes,
"hard cases make bad law," 2 4 7 and that may be the case with Versata
Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.248 The target in that case was very
peculiar: small, concentrated capitalization, publicly-held, with
abnormally large NOLs. 249 Moreover, the would-be acquirer was
250
unique: a shareholder, a judgment creditor, and a competitor.
Perhaps Selectica will be cabined to its specific set of facts, a situation
in which a bizarre competitor threatened a tax asset of at least possible
value and in which a proxy contest would have required recruiting
only a few other shareholders, though most had interests adverse to
the competitor. Or, following rulings in Selectica, Airgas251 and
Ruprecht,252 boards will feel empowered to hold activist shareholders
at arm's-length back behind the 5% line with an NOL poison pill with
a low trigger. Following Selectica, any target with NOLs will be able to

246 See Rock, supra note 27, at 891-92 (suggesting that an NOL poison pill could be
used by a corporate board to choose its own shareholders).
247 See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called
great, not by reason of their real importance... but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment.").
248 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
249 See id. at 590.
250 See id.
251 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); see
discussion supra Part I.C.
252 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May
2, 2014) (upholding Sotheby's shareholder rights plan, which created a 10% trigger
for shareholders who file a Schedule 13D with the SEC, versus a 20% trigger for
shareholders who file a Schedule 13G).
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convince a court of the threat to that tax asset, though outside of this
context, taxpayer do not complain of the vagaries of section 382. In
the worst case, taxpayers with or without NOLs will be able to use a
garden-variety poison pill with a very low trigger. Because Airgas set a
low bar for what constitutes a threat under Unocal and because
Selectica set a high bar for what constitutes a preclusive reaction to
that threat, the next poison pill case may put the last nail in the Unocal
test's coffin. If Airgas stood for the proposition that boards can "just
say no," the next case will decide whether boards can "just say go."
APPENDIX

A

NOL Poison Pill Companies (Dec. 29, 1998 - Feb. 27, 2014)
Company Name 253
1

Winland

Market
Capitalization 254
2,286,807

Adoption
Date
2/27/2014

SIC
Code
3823

2/13/2014

2452

5,633,500

1/27/2014

5311

2,462,547,444

1/9/2014
11/12/2013
10/31/2013

6172
7830
2836

10,500,000,000
28,877,19325
3,100,000,000

Electronics

2
3
4
5
6

Aetrium
Incorporated
J. C. Penney
Company, Inc.
Ally Financial
Tix Corporation
ARIAD
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

253

The list of companies that adopted NOL poison pills during this time period

was provided by a database called Shark Repellent. See

SHARK

REPELLENT,

https://sharkrepellent.net/ (last visited July 12, 2016). The data relating to SIC codes
and market capitalization was hand-collected from information provided by each
company in its filings with the SEC, unless otherwise noted.
254 Unless otherwise noted, for purposes of this data, "market capitalization" means
the value given by such firm in its Annual Report on Form 10-K filed for the year in
which the firm adopted an NOL poison pill as the aggregate value of common stock
held by non-affiliates. Because this amount does not include common shares held by
affiliates, the actual market capitalization would be somewhat higher for each firm.
255 Tix Corporation is not a reporting company and does not choose to file Annual
Reports with the SEC or on its website. This market capitalization was derived from
the number of outstanding shares (23,669,831) entitled to vote at its 2013 annual
meeting as of the record date, October 11, 2013, at the share price on November 15,
2013 ($1.22/share). See Tix Corporation, Proxy Statement, at 2 (Oct. 21, 2013),

edgl .precisionir.com/irwebsites/tixcorp/rix-2013-Proxy-Statement.pdf.
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The Dolan
Company
Transcept
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

256

9/17/2013

7389

191,045,862

9/13/2013

2834

48,144,662

9/9/2013

5045

10,100,000

9/3/2013

6798

66,000,000

7/22/2013
6/20/2013
6/19/2013
5/23/2013

6022
3577
1531
38.45

1,825,859,491
8,000,000
272,056,141
40,509,124

2/13/2013

4512

2,150,000,000

2/12/2013

3360

45,807,796

2/7/2013

6035

90,100,000

1/24/2013

1731

39,100,000

1/14/2013

5400

414,100,000

10/24/2012

6021

5,900,000

9/25/2012

6035

271,900,000

9/12/2012

6022

17,300,000

8/27/2012
8/26/2012
6/7/2012

4400
7374
4813

4,600,000
2,600,000,000
344,612,156

5/4/2012

2834

1,120,026,053

3/29/2012

2834

69,028,808

2 56

SED International
Holdings, Inc.
IMPAC Mortgage
Holdings, Inc.
CapitalSource Inc.
iGo, Inc.
A V Homes, Inc.
Digirad
Corporation
US Airways Group,
Inc.
Broadwind Energy,
Inc.
BBX Capital
Corporation
Integrated
Electrical Services,
Inc.
Krispy Kreme
Doughnuts, Inc.
First Security
Group, Inc.
HomeTrust
Bancshares, Inc.
Old Second
Bancorp, Inc.
Horizon Lines, Inc.
AOL Inc.
Vonage Holdings
Corp.
Dendreon
Corporation
Myrexis, Inc.

Now Paratek Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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29
30
31

The Howard
Hughes
Corporation
Makemusic, Inc.
Soffech, Inc.
Unwired Planet,
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2/24/2012

6798

2,300,000,000

2/21/2012
2/3/2012
1/28/2012

7372
7373
7372

11,427,417
1,085,391
134,990,661

12/20/2011
11/23/2011

1389
7389

209,300,000
20,112,000

11/15/2011

6022

16,550,000

10/17/2011

7389

262,880,716259

10/14/2011

6021

1,268,609

9/29/2011
9/15/2011

1400
6531

395,400,000
37,949,000

8/25/2011

2836

216,835,372

8/5/2011
8/1/2011

2870
3861

228,300,000
963,000,000

7/29/2011

2834

7,372,544

6/13/2011

8062

283,800,000

5/6/2011

1531

14,209,972

5/4/2011
4/10/2011

7389
4813

22,995,805
2,990,000,000

Inc.257

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Steel Excel Inc.
Internet Patents
258
Corporation
Independent Bank
Corporation
ModusLink Global
Solutions, Inc.
FNBH Bancorp,
Inc.
USEC Inc. 260
Novation
Companies, Inc.
Biota
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

26 1

Rentech, Inc.
Eastman Kodak
Company
Harbor
BioSciences, Inc.
MedCath
Corporation
Comstock Holding
Companies, Inc.
Onvia, Inc.
Level 3
Communications,
Inc.

Now Great Elm Capital Group, Inc.
258 Formerly Prism Technologies Group, Inc.
259 A Form 10-K covering the date of adoption is not available. This figure is for
the fiscal year ended July 31, 2011, or the week prior to the adoption.
260 Now Centrus Energy Corp.
261 Now Aviragen Therapeutics, Inc.
257
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CommunityOne
Bancorp
American
International
Group, Inc.
Blackstone
Mortgage Trust,

4/15/2011

6021

4,600,000

3/9/2011

6331

12,986,000,000

3/3/2011

6798

85,956,988

2/22/2011

6022

594,196,291

2/7/2011

5331

228,988,886

1/7/2011

8062

2,576,016,843

1/6/2011

3674

218,914,302

11/29/2010

2834

61,950,645

11/23/2010

4911

1,334,952,151

11/23/2010

6022

42,804,000

11/18/2010

6022

44,163,154

11/05/2010

6036

13,700,000

9/13/2010

4812

801,693,696

9/13/2010

6351

2,569,424

8/12/2010

6351

403,800,000

7/7/2010

3661

17,359,619

Inc. 262

50

51
52
53

54

55
56

57
58
59
60
61
62

United
Community Banks
Inc.
Retail Ventures,
Inc.
Tenet Healthcare
Corporation
SatCon
Technology
Corporation
Columbia
Laboratories,
Inc. 263
GenOn Energy,
Inc.
Central Pacific
Financial
Corporation
Fidelity Southern
Corporation
Anchor BanCorp
Wisconsin Inc.
Leap Wireless
International, Inc.
Triad Guaranty
Inc.
The PMI Group,
Inc.
Ditech Networks,
Inc.

262 Formerly Capital Trust, Inc.
263 Now Juniper Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Extreme
Networks, Inc.
The Allied Defense
Group, Inc.
Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc.
SMTC Corporation
Autobytel Inc.
THQ Inc.
Synovus Financial
Corp.
Sterling Financial
Corporation
Abraxas Petroleum
Corporation
Centerline Holding
Company
Sajan, Inc. 265
Ambac Financial
Group Inc.
Pendrell
266
Corporation
Institutional
Financial Markets,
Inc.

77
78
79
80

81
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6/30/2010

3576

256,400,000

6/24/2010

3480

29,471,514

6/22/2010

2452

32,515,711264

6/9/2010
5/26/2010
5/11/2010
4/26/2010

3672
7370
7372
6021

41,200,000
51,000,000
273,100,000
1,838,002,043

4/14/2010

6036

28,000,000

3/16/2010

1311

191,912,033

3/5/2010

6500

39,200,000

2/25/2010
2/2/2010

7389
6351

10,146,573
192,435,130

1/29/2010

6794

247,684,867

12/21/2009

6211

43,200,000

11/12/2009

5940

17,529,757

11/5/2009
11/3/2009

3272
1221

64,377,699
336,982,000

10/30/2009

3714

160,400,000

10/28/2009

7373

2 67

Hancock Fabrics,
Inc.
U.S. Concrete, Inc.
James River Coal
Company
American Axle &
Manufacturing
Holdings, Inc.
Asure Software,

5,830,460269

2

Inc. 68

264 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
March 26, 2010, the last year for which an annual report is publicly available.
265 Formerly Mathstar, Inc.
266 Formerly ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Ltd.
267 Formerly Cohen & Co.
268 Formerly Forgent Networks, Inc.
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83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

91
92
93
94
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West Coast
Bancorp
Radian Group Inc.
Century
Aluminum
Company
Interstate Hotels &
Resorts, Inc.
BFC Financial
Corporation
Energy Conversion
Devices, Inc.
Ford Motor
Company
SFN Group, Inc.
EasyLink Services
International
Corp.
D.R. Horton, Inc.
Cinedigm Corp.
Mindspeed
Technologies, Inc.
PMA Capital

10/23/2009

6022

32,090,000

10/9/2009
9/29/2009

6351
3334

223,726,164
285,000,000

9/24/2009

7011

78,697,381270

9/21/2009

6035

10,800,000

9/30/2009

3674

483,500,000

9/11/2009

3711

36,667,239,288

9/9/2009

7363

210,526,156

8/25/2009

7371

37,470,298

8/19/2009
8/10/2009
8/9/2009

1531
7841
3674

2,802,403,000
31,496,000
36,000,000

8/6/2009

6331

144,452,431

8/3/2009

2510

147,589,000

8/12/2009
7/31/2009

6172
1531

7,287,295,487272
39,641,446

7/27/2009

2800

583,700,000

Corporation

95

Furniture Brands
International,
Inc.271

96
97
98

CIT Group Inc.
Beazer Homes
USA, Inc.
Solutia Inc.

269 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended July 31, 2009, two months prior to the adoption date, which is the last publicly
available annual report for this issuer.
270 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended Dec. 31, 2008, ten months prior to the adoption date, which is the last publicly
available annual report for this issuer.
271 Now FBI Wind Down Inc.
272 This figure is the value of the issuer's common stock as of the date the issuer
emerged from bankruptcy protection on February 26, 2010; however, the value of the
original common stock that was cancelled pursuant to the bankruptcy was listed as
$842,945,475 as of June 30, 2009.
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100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Tri-S Security
Corporation
MGIC Investment
Corporation
Destination XL
274
Group, Inc.
Toll Brothers, Inc.
Opnext, Inc.
Citigroup Inc.
Arlington Asset
Investment Corp.
ALJ Regional
Holdings, Inc.
Sirius XM
Holdings Inc.
Power-One, Inc.
Youbet.com Inc.
Mirant
Corporation
Quixote
Corporation
CIFC Corp. 276
PulteGroup, Inc.
Centex
Corporation

115
116
273
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6,981,505273

7/16/2009

7381

7/7/2009

6351

535,000,000

6/29/2009

5651

62,300,000

6/17/2009
6/18/2009
6/9/2009
6/1/2009

1531
3674
6021
6799

2,807,990,000
154,622,572
16,300,000,000
56,000,000

5/13/2009

7389

4/28/2009

4832

1,670,079,432

4/23/2009
3/31/2009
3/26/2009

3679
7990
4911

134,187,000
99,100,000
2,283,856,245

3/16/2009

3089

54,246,888

3/11/2009
3/5/2009
2/24/2009

6199
1531
1531

28,255,178
1,890,933,614
2,010,000,000

2/5/2009

5065

1,632,996

2/4/2009

2834

19,800,000

10,219,671275

277

CLST Holdings,
Inc.
Footstar, Inc.

This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal

year ended December 31, 2008, seven months prior to the adoption date, which is the
last publicly available annual report for the issuer.
274 Formerly Casual Male Retail Group Inc.
275 ALJ Regional Holdings was not a reporting company until 2016, and as such
has not yet filed Annual Reports with the SEC. This market capitalization was derived
from the number of shares listed as outstanding in ALJ's own unaudited financials as
of September 30, 2009 at the market price on that day of $.21/share. See ALJ REGIONAL
HOLDINGS, INC., ANNUAL

REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER

30, 2009,

The
(2009) www.aljregionalholdings.com/clientcontent/alj/docs/Sept09Annual.pdf.
market price for ALJ shares on September 30, 2009 is available at AL Regional
Holdings, Inc. Common Stock Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ, www.nasdaq.com/
symbol/aljj/historical (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
276 Formerly Deerfield Capital Corp.
277 Now Centex LLC.
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118
119
120
121
122
123

124
125
126

127
128

129

130

KB Home
CNO Financial
278
Group, Inc.
tw telecom inc.
Lear Corporation
The Ryland Group,
Inc.
Selectica Inc.
Woodbridge
Holdings
Corporation
Rural/Metro
Corporation
Hovnanian
Enterprises, Inc.
Reinsurance
Group of America,
Inc.
EDCI Holdings
Inc.
The Management
Network Group
279
Inc.
Stamford
Industrial Group,
Inc.
Black Diamond,
Inc.

131

1/22/2009
1/20/2009

1531
6321

1,321,039,890
430,000,000

1/20/2009
12/23/2008
12/17/2008

4813
3714
1531

1,500,000,000
984,714,024
908,752,014

11/17/2008
9/29/2008

7372
6552

29,009,803
88,200,000

9/15/2008

4100

21,000,000

7/29/2008

1531

443,351,894

6/1/2008

6311

2,600,000,000

4/2/2008

3663

28,600,000

3/27/2008

8742

24,500,000

2/11/2008

3460

53,225,106

2/7/2008

3949

76,900,000

10/23/2007

5063

15,651,056282

28 0

Signature Group

Holdings, Inc.

281

278 Formerly Conseco, Inc.
279 Now Cartesian, Inc.
280 Formerly Clarus Corp.
281 Now Real Industry, Inc. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. was the successor in
bankruptcy to the legacy business of Fremont General Corporation, which filed for
bankruptcy protection in June 2008 and emerged from bankruptcy as Signature in
June 2010.
282 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2009, which purported to make current the company's filing
obligations since fiscal year 2007. However, the market capitalization listed is as of
June 30, 2009 only.
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8/13/2007

4841

1,500,000,000

6/7/2007

5990

245,969,000

6/1/2007

5200

5,404,871

1/22/2007

3679

21,499,215

8/4/2006
7/11/2006

7389
6022

90,000,000
359,600,000

138

Inc.
NOVT
Corporation

5/31/2006

3845

139
140

USG Corporation
SWI Holdings

1/30/2006
1/26/2006

3270
6159

10/17/2005
9/1/2005

2834
3576

12,302,775287
9,669,668

5/2/20052m

2211

24,610,362

132

133
134
135
136
137

Charter
Communications,
Inc.
Star Gas Partners,
L.P.
EDEN Bioscience
Corporation
DGT Holdings
Corp. 283
Web.com, Inc.
Hilltop Holdings
284

Corporation

16,050,000285

2,882,045,000
63,857,628

286

141
142

Cygnus, Inc.
CoSine
Communications

143

JPS Industries Inc.

Inc.

283 Formerly DEL Global Technologies Corp.
284 Formerly Affordable Residential Communities Inc.
285 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2005, six months prior to the adoption date, which is the last
annual report publicly available. NOV Corporation deregistered its common stock
with the SEC on August 11, 2006. See NOV Corporation, Current Report (Form 8K) (Aug. 11, 2006).
286 Formerly Kana Software, Inc.
287 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2004, ten months prior to the adoption date, which is the last
annual report publicly available. Cygnus, Inc. was granted a no-action letter from the
SEC relieving the company of its duty to file a Form 10-K for 2005 due to its
dissolution and liquidation in early 2006. See Cygnus, Inc., Current Report (Form 8K) (Mar. 28, 2006).
288 Sharkrepellent.net reports that JPS Industries adopted an NOL poison pill as of
this date; however, JPS Industries was not a reporting company, so there is no publicly
available document evidencing this. However, trade publications noted the adoption
of the plan at the time, and the May 2005 plan was referenced in documents filed
pursuant to JPS Industries' acquisition by Handy & Harman Ltd. See Companies in
Controversy Shore Up Protections, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (July 1, 2005),
www.themiddlemarket.com/maj/20050701/31659-1.html; Handy & Harman Ltd.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 1, 2015) (reporting that Handy & Harman was
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144
145

146

Bayou Steel
Corporation
WheelingPittsburgh
Corporation
Wilhelmina
International,
Inc.

147
148
149
150

151
152
153
154
155

3312

2/14/2005

3312

161,000,000

6/18/2004

8742

11,386,024

10/6/2003
5/15/2003

6500
9995

15,137,220
3,584,377

4/29/2003
7/29/2002

2211
6321

3,727,011
38,608,000

1/23/2002
1/10/2002

6798
6141

97,381,769
6,300,000292

6/6/2000

6324

22,585,305

12/23/1999

5812

21,960,991

12/29/1998

1600

4,298,385

290

BNS Holding Inc.
NCM Services
Inc.

90,000,000289

3/8/2005

29 1

Crown Crafts, Inc.
American
Independence
Corp.
CRIIMI Mae Inc.
HomeGold
Financial, Inc.
Maxicare Health
Plans, Inc.
Fog Cutter Capital
293
Group Inc.
Sterling
Construction
Company, Inc. 294

acquiring JPS Industries and that JPS Industries was amending its 2005 shareholder
rights plan to allow for the acquisition).
289 This price is derived from news reports that Black Diamond Capital
Management LLC purchased all the stock of Bayou Steel on June 1, 2006 for $150
million, which represented a 66.67% premium over the existing share price. See Bayou
Steel Announces Closing of Acquisition, BUSINESS WIRE (June 1, 2006, 4:40 PM),
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060601005969/en/Bayou-Steel-AnnouncesClosing-Acquisition.
290 Formerly New Century Equity Holdings.
291 Formerly Geoworks Corporation.
292 This figure is from the issuer's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2001, ten days prior to the adoption date, which is the last
annual report publicly available. In March 2003, prior to filing a Form 10-K for 2002,
the company filed for bankruptcy protection. See Homegold Financial, Inc., Current
Report, (Form 8-K) (June 30, 2003).
293 Formerly Wilshire Real Estate Investment Trust Inc.
294 Formerly Oakhurst Company, Inc.
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APPENDIX B

Adoptions by Year (Jan. 1998 - Feb. 27, 2014)
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APPENDIX C

Adoptions by Market Capitalization and Year
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